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Search Results (5 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-31870 | 1 Yhirose | 1 Cpp-httplib | 2026-03-20 | 7.5 High |
| cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.37.1, when a cpp-httplib client uses the streaming API (httplib::stream::Get, httplib::stream::Post, etc.), the library calls std::stoull() directly on the Content-Length header value received from the server with no input validation and no exception handling. std::stoull throws std::invalid_argument for non-numeric strings and std::out_of_range for values exceeding ULLONG_MAX. Since nothing catches these exceptions, the C++ runtime calls std::terminate(), which kills the process with SIGABRT. Any server the client connects to — including servers reached via HTTP redirects, third-party APIs, or man-in-the-middle positions can crash the client application with a single HTTP response. No authentication is required. No interaction from the end user is required. The crash is deterministic and immediate. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.37.1. | ||||
| CVE-2025-66577 | 1 Yhirose | 1 Cpp-httplib | 2025-12-11 | 5.3 Medium |
| cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.27.0, a vulnerability allows attacker-controlled HTTP headers to influence server-visible metadata, logging, and authorization decisions. An attacker can supply X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP headers which get accepted unconditionally by get_client_ip() in docker/main.cc, causing access and error logs (nginx_access_logger / nginx_error_logger) to record spoofed client IPs (log poisoning / audit evasion). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.27.0. | ||||
| CVE-2025-66570 | 1 Yhirose | 1 Cpp-httplib | 2025-12-10 | 10 Critical |
| cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.27.0, a vulnerability allows attacker-controlled HTTP headers to influence server-visible metadata, logging, and authorization decisions. An attacker can inject headers named REMOTE_ADDR, REMOTE_PORT, LOCAL_ADDR, LOCAL_PORT that are parsed into the request header multimap via read_headers() in httplib.h (headers.emplace), then the server later appends its own internal metadata using the same header names in Server::process_request without erasing duplicates. Because Request::get_header_value returns the first entry for a header key (id == 0) and the client-supplied headers are parsed before server-inserted headers, downstream code that uses these header names may inadvertently use attacker-controlled values. Affected files/locations: cpp-httplib/httplib.h (read_headers, Server::process_request, Request::get_header_value, get_header_value_u64) and cpp-httplib/docker/main.cc (get_client_ip, nginx_access_logger, nginx_error_logger). Attack surface: attacker-controlled HTTP headers in incoming requests flow into the Request.headers multimap and into logging code that reads forwarded headers, enabling IP spoofing, log poisoning, and authorization bypass via header shadowing. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.27.0. | ||||
| CVE-2020-11709 | 1 Yhirose | 1 Cpp-httplib | 2025-08-05 | 7.5 High |
| cpp-httplib through 0.5.8 does not filter \r\n in parameters passed into the set_redirect and set_header functions, which creates possibilities for CRLF injection and HTTP response splitting in some specific contexts. | ||||
| CVE-2025-46728 | 2 Cpp-httplib Project, Yhirose | 2 Cpp-httplib, Cpp-httplib | 2025-08-01 | 7.5 High |
| cpp-httplib is a C++ header-only HTTP/HTTPS server and client library. Prior to version 0.20.1, the library fails to enforce configured size limits on incoming request bodies when `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` is used or when no `Content-Length` header is provided. A remote attacker can send a chunked request without the terminating zero-length chunk, causing uncontrolled memory allocation on the server. This leads to potential exhaustion of system memory and results in a server crash or unresponsiveness. Version 0.20.1 fixes the issue by enforcing limits during parsing. If the limit is exceeded at any point during reading, the connection is terminated immediately. A short-term workaround through a Reverse Proxy is available. If updating the library immediately is not feasible, deploy a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, HAProxy) in front of the `cpp-httplib` application. Configure the proxy to enforce maximum request body size limits, thereby stopping excessively large requests before they reach the vulnerable library code. | ||||
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