| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/entry: Scrub r12 register on kernel entry
Before commit f33f2d4c7c80 ("s390/bp: remove TIF_ISOLATE_BP"),
all entry handlers loaded r12 with the current task pointer
(lg %r12,__LC_CURRENT) for use by the BPENTER/BPEXIT macros. That
commit removed TIF_ISOLATE_BP, dropping both the branch prediction
macros and the r12 load, but did not add r12 to the register clearing
sequence.
Add the missing xgr %r12,%r12 to make the register scrub consistent
across all entry points. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: fix panic when IPv4 route references loopback IPv6 nexthop
When a standalone IPv6 nexthop object is created with a loopback device
(e.g., "ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"), fib6_nh_init() misclassifies
it as a reject route. This is because nexthop objects have no destination
prefix (fc_dst=::), causing fib6_is_reject() to match any loopback
nexthop. The reject path skips fib_nh_common_init(), leaving
nhc_pcpu_rth_output unallocated. If an IPv4 route later references this
nexthop, __mkroute_output() dereferences NULL nhc_pcpu_rth_output and
panics.
Simplify the check in fib6_nh_init() to only match explicit reject
routes (RTF_REJECT) instead of using fib6_is_reject(). The loopback
promotion heuristic in fib6_is_reject() is handled separately by
ip6_route_info_create_nh(). After this change, the three cases behave
as follows:
1. Explicit reject route ("ip -6 route add unreachable 2001:db8::/64"):
RTF_REJECT is set, enters reject path, skips fib_nh_common_init().
No behavior change.
2. Implicit loopback reject route ("ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/32 dev lo"):
RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is
called. ip6_route_info_create_nh() still promotes it to reject
afterward. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is allocated but unused, which is
harmless.
3. Standalone nexthop object ("ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"):
RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is
called. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is properly allocated, fixing the crash
when IPv4 routes reference this nexthop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: pegasus: validate USB endpoints
The pegasus driver should validate that the device it is probing has the
proper number and types of USB endpoints it is expecting before it binds
to it. If a malicious device were to not have the same urbs the driver
will crash later on when it blindly accesses these endpoints. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: prevent kernel-infoleak in con_font_get()
font.data may not initialize all memory spaces depending on the implementation
of vc->vc_sw->con_font_get. This may cause info-leak, so to prevent this, it
is safest to modify it to initialize the allocated memory space to 0, and it
generally does not affect the overall performance of the system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: addrlabel: fix infoleak when sending struct ifaddrlblmsg to network
When copying a `struct ifaddrlblmsg` to the network, __ifal_reserved
remained uninitialized, resulting in a 1-byte infoleak:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-network-infoleak in __netdev_start_xmit ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4841
__netdev_start_xmit ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4841
netdev_start_xmit ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4857
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1dc/0x800 net/core/dev.c:3606
__dev_queue_xmit+0x17e8/0x4350 net/core/dev.c:4256
dev_queue_xmit ./include/linux/netdevice.h:3009
__netlink_deliver_tap_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:307
__netlink_deliver_tap+0x728/0xad0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:325
netlink_deliver_tap net/netlink/af_netlink.c:338
__netlink_sendskb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1263
netlink_sendskb+0x1d9/0x200 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1272
netlink_unicast+0x56d/0xf50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1360
nlmsg_unicast ./include/net/netlink.h:1061
rtnl_unicast+0x5a/0x80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:758
ip6addrlbl_get+0xfad/0x10f0 net/ipv6/addrlabel.c:628
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xb33/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6082
...
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x118/0xb00 mm/slab.h:742
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x4f2/0x930 mm/slub.c:3437
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:954
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x117/0x3d0 mm/slab_common.c:975
kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:437
__alloc_skb+0x27a/0xab0 net/core/skbuff.c:509
alloc_skb ./include/linux/skbuff.h:1267
nlmsg_new ./include/net/netlink.h:964
ip6addrlbl_get+0x490/0x10f0 net/ipv6/addrlabel.c:608
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xb33/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6082
netlink_rcv_skb+0x299/0x550 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2540
rtnetlink_rcv+0x26/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6109
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319
netlink_unicast+0x9ab/0xf50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0xebc/0x10f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
...
This patch ensures that the reserved field is always initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcxhr: initialize mutexes before requesting threaded IRQ
pcxhr_probe() requests pcxhr_threaded_irq() before initializing
mgr->lock, even though the threaded handler takes that mutex.
Initialize the manager locks before request_threaded_irq() so an
early interrupt cannot run against uninitialized mutex state during
probe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix reinitialisation of the inode, in particular ->lock_work
It seems that initalising afs_vnode::lock_work a single time in the slab's
init function isn't sufficient for work_structs. This results in the
DEBUG_OBJECTS debugging stuff producing a warning occasionally when running
the generic/131 xfstest:
ODEBUG: activate not available (active state 0) object: 0000000016d8760f object type: work_struct hint: afs_lock_work+0x0/0x220
WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x4b/0x90, CPU#3: locktest/7695
...
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 7695 Comm: locktest Tainted: G S 7.1.0-build3+ #2771 PREEMPT
...
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x65/0x90
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __pfx_afs_lock_work+0x10/0x10
debug_object_activate+0x122/0x170
insert_work+0x25/0x60
__queue_work+0x2e0/0x340
queue_delayed_work_on+0x48/0x70
afs_fl_release_private+0x57/0x70
locks_release_private+0x5c/0xa0
locks_free_lock+0xe/0x20
posix_lock_inode+0x55f/0x5b0
locks_lock_inode_wait+0x81/0x140
? file_write_and_wait_range+0x50/0x70
afs_lock+0xcd/0x110
fcntl_setlk+0x10d/0x260
do_fcntl+0x24e/0x5b0
__do_sys_fcntl+0x6a/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x11e/0x310
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
Fix this by reinitialising ->lock_work after allocating an inode.
Also, flush ->lock_work when the inode is being evicted to make sure it's
not still running. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: fix stack info leak in tap_ioctl() SIOCGIFHWADDR
In the SIOCGIFHWADDR path, tap_ioctl() copies 16 bytes of an
uninitialised on-stack struct sockaddr_storage to userspace via
ifr_hwaddr, but netif_get_mac_address() only writes sa_family and
dev->addr_len (6 for Ethernet) bytes, leaving sa_data[6..13] uninitialised.
Those 8 trailing bytes leak kernel stack contents; SIOCGIFHWADDR on a
macvtap chardev returns kernel .text and direct-map pointers, defeating
KASLR.
Initialise ss at declaration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Clear VRAM on allocation to prevent stale data exposure
KFD VRAM allocations set AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_WIPE_ON_RELEASE
but not AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_CLEARED, leaving freshly allocated
VRAM with stale data from prior use observable by compute kernels.
The GEM ioctl path already sets VRAM_CLEARED for all userspace
allocations via amdgpu_gem_create_ioctl() and
amdgpu_mode_dumb_create(). The KFD path was missing this flag,
allowing stale page table remnants to leak into user buffers.
This causes crashes in RCCL P2P transport where non-zero data in
ptrExchange/head/tail fields corrupts the protocol handshake. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy
via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on
sn->gssp_lock. Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is
immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the
window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized
struct mutex.
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)
proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", ...) /* dentry live */
init_gssp_clnt(sn)
mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock) /* too late */
write_gssp()
set_gssp_clnt(net)
mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock) /* uninitialized */
gssp_rpc_create(...)
sn->gssp_clnt = clnt
mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock)
The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()
returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the
registering thread is preempted there while another task is already
opening the freshly published file. register_pernet_subsys() runs in
preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is
possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the
proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are
already running. A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled
struct mutex. On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a
"lock used without init" splat; on a production kernel the fast path
acquires the lock via CMPXCHG(owner, 0, current). In the latter case
a second writer that arrives before init_gssp_clnt() re-zeroes owner
can enter set_gssp_clnt() concurrently, shut down the first writer's
clnt while it is still in use, and leak the loser's clnt.
Fix by initializing sn->gssp_lock in sunrpc_init_net() so its lifetime
matches the sunrpc_net it lives in. sn->gssp_clnt is already NULL from
the kzalloc that backs net_generic storage, so the lazy helper is no
longer needed; drop init_gssp_clnt(), its prototype, and the call from
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(). sunrpc.ko is a build-time
dependency of auth_rpcgss.ko, so sunrpc_init_net() has always run on
every netns before any auth_gss pernet init can publish the proc
entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: ndisc: fix ndisc_ra_useropt to initialize nduseropt_padX fields to zero to prevent an info-leak
When processing Router Advertisements with user options the kernel
builds an RTM_NEWNDUSEROPT netlink message. The nduseroptmsg struct
has three padding fields that are never zeroed and can leak kernel data
The fix is simple, just zeroes the padding fields. |
| curl 7.7 through 7.76.1 suffers from an information disclosure when the `-t` command line option, known as `CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS` in libcurl, is used to send variable=content pairs to TELNET servers. Due to a flaw in the option parser for sending NEW_ENV variables, libcurl could be made to pass on uninitialized data from a stack based buffer to the server, resulting in potentially revealing sensitive internal information to the server using a clear-text network protocol. |
| A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel in versions prior to v5.14-rc1. Missing size validations on inbound SCTP packets may allow the kernel to read uninitialized memory. |
| net/can/bcm.c in the Linux kernel through 5.12.10 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory because parts of a data structure are uninitialized. |
| An issue was discovered in slc_bump in drivers/net/can/slcan.c in the Linux kernel 3.16 through 5.6.2. It allows attackers to read uninitialized can_frame data, potentially containing sensitive information from kernel stack memory, if the configuration lacks CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL, aka CID-b9258a2cece4. |
| Python's elementtree C accelerator failed to initialise Expat's hash salt during initialization. This could make it easy to conduct denial of service attacks against Expat by constructing an XML document that would cause pathological hash collisions in Expat's internal data structures, consuming large amounts CPU and RAM. The vulnerability exists in Python versions 3.7.0, 3.6.0 through 3.6.6, 3.5.0 through 3.5.6, 3.4.0 through 3.4.9, 2.7.0 through 2.7.15. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hsi: omap_ssi_core: fix missing DMA mask setup for SSI controller device
The OMAP SSI driver uses a synthetic HSI controller device allocated via
hsi_alloc_controller(), which does not go through the normal OF/platform
device initialization path.
As a result, the embedded struct device does not have a DMA mask
initialized by default.
After recent DMA API hardening changes, dma_map_sg() and related helpers
now require a valid dma_mask to be present, otherwise the driver may
crash or trigger warnings when attempting DMA mapping operations.
Fix this by explicitly initializing the DMA mask for the SSI controller
device and setting a 32-bit DMA mask, which matches the hardware
capabilities. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports
PF_KEY export paths use `pfkey_sockaddr_size()` when reserving sockaddr
payload space, so IPv6 addresses occupy 32 bytes on the wire. However,
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()` initializes only the first 28 bytes of
`struct sockaddr_in6`, leaving the final 4 aligned bytes uninitialized.
Not every PF_KEY message is affected. The state and policy dump builders
already zero the whole message buffer before filling the sockaddr
payloads. Keep the fix to the export paths that still append aligned
sockaddr payloads with plain `skb_put()`:
- `SADB_ACQUIRE`
- `SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING`
- `SADB_X_MIGRATE`
Fix those paths by clearing only the aligned sockaddr tail after
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD)
Sashiko notes:
> if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
> userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
> SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
> execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
> host?
The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note:
> On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted.
That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the
firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do
anything if SNP has not been previously initialized.
This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a
mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be
maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for SEV ioctls
Sashiko notes:
> if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
> userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
> SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
> execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
> host?
sev_move_to_init_state() is called for ioctls requiring only SEV firmware:
SEV_PEK_GEN, SEV_PDH_GEN, SEV_PEK_CSR, SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT, and
SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT. After the firmware command, it does SEV_SHUTDOWN on
the SEV firmware. Since these commands do not require SNP to be
initialized, skip it by calling __sev_platform_init_locked() which only
initializes the SEV firmware. This way SNP is not Initialized at all, and
HSAVE_PA is not cleared.
The previous code saved any SEV initialization firmware error to
init_args.error and then threw it away and hardcoded the return value of
INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE regardless of the real firmware error. This patch
changes it to surface the underlying error, which is hopefully both more
useful and doesn't cause any problems.
Note that it is still safe to call __sev_firmware_shutdown() directly: it
calls __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(), which skips SNP shutdown if SNP was not
initialized. |
