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Search Results (6 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-1118 | 1 Redhat | 3 Enterprise Linux, Openshift, Rhel Els | 2026-11-05 | 4.4 Medium |
| A flaw was found in grub2. Grub's dump command is not blocked when grub is in lockdown mode, which allows the user to read any memory information, and an attacker may leverage this in order to extract signatures, salts, and other sensitive information from the memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72183 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path. A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group's task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it. The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller's thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller's thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked. Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is enforced against each group member at delivery time. That recording is necessary but not sufficient on its own: the kernel signals a process group through its members' thread-group leaders, and the leader of the registrant's own process can carry a different Landlock domain than the sibling thread that armed the owner. domain_is_scoped() would then deny that leader, even though commit 18eb75f3af40 ("landlock: Always allow signals between threads of the same process") requires same-process delivery to be allowed. hook_task_kill() avoids this by evaluating same_thread_group() live, per recipient; the SIGIO path instead delegates the whole decision to a single registration-time check, which a process-group fan-out cannot honor. So also record the registrant's thread group next to its domain and exempt it at delivery: hook_file_send_sigiotask() allows the signal whenever the recipient belongs to the registrant's own process, restoring the same-process guarantee while keeping out-of-domain group members blocked. The direct kill() path (hook_task_kill) already evaluates the live domain and is unaffected. [mic: Check pid_type earlier and improve comment, fix commit message, fix comment formatting] | ||||
| CVE-2020-4077 | 1 Electronjs | 1 Electron | 2024-11-21 | 7.7 High |
| In Electron before versions 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21, there is a context isolation bypass. Code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. Apps using both `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is fixed in versions 9.0.0-beta.21, 8.2.4 and 7.2.4. | ||||
| CVE-2020-4076 | 1 Electronjs | 1 Electron | 2024-11-21 | 7.8 High |
| In Electron before versions 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21, there is a context isolation bypass. Code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. Apps using contextIsolation are affected. This is fixed in versions 9.0.0-beta.21, 8.2.4 and 7.2.4. | ||||
| CVE-2020-15096 | 1 Electronjs | 1 Electron | 2024-11-21 | 6.8 Medium |
| In Electron before versions 6.1.1, 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21, there is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. Apps using "contextIsolation" are affected. There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected. This is fixed in versions 6.1.1, 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21. | ||||
| CVE-2019-0035 | 1 Juniper | 1 Junos | 2024-11-21 | 6.8 Medium |
| When "set system ports console insecure" is enabled, root login is disallowed for Junos OS as expected. However, the root password can be changed using "set system root-authentication plain-text-password" on systems booted from an OAM (Operations, Administration, and Maintenance) volume, leading to a possible administrative bypass with physical access to the console. OAM volumes (e.g. flash drives) are typically instantiated as /dev/gpt/oam, or /oam for short. Password recovery, changing the root password from a console, should not have been allowed from an insecure console. Affected releases are Juniper Networks Junos OS: 15.1 versions prior to 15.1F6-S12, 15.1R7-S3; 15.1X49 versions prior to 15.1X49-D160; 15.1X53 versions prior to 15.1X53-D236, 15.1X53-D496, 15.1X53-D68; 16.1 versions prior to 16.1R3-S10, 16.1R6-S6, 16.1R7-S3; 16.1X65 versions prior to 16.1X65-D49; 16.2 versions prior to 16.2R2-S8; 17.1 versions prior to 17.1R2-S10, 17.1R3; 17.2 versions prior to 17.2R1-S8, 17.2R3-S1; 17.3 versions prior to 17.3R3-S3; 17.4 versions prior to 17.4R1-S6, 17.4R2-S2; 18.1 versions prior to 18.1R2-S4, 18.1R3-S3; 18.2 versions prior to 18.2R2; 18.2X75 versions prior to 18.2X75-D40; 18.3 versions prior to 18.3R1-S2. This issue does not affect Junos OS releases prior to 15.1. | ||||
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