| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| DateTime::Lite versions before 0.8.1 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via a per-day loop when adding seconds.
_normalize_leap_seconds crosses day boundaries one day at a time, so add(seconds => $n) on an object with a non-floating time zone takes about |$n|/86400 iterations, and nothing limits $n. The XS implementation and the pure-Perl fallback both have the loop.
An attacker who controls the number of seconds added can keep the process busy for as long as they choose. |
| The Symfony Yaml components Inline and Parser, parse some YAML documents inefficiently, so that a small crafted document can take disproportionately long to process, keeping a PHP process busy for seconds or minutes, potentially causing a denial of service in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
The parser repeats work it has already done in several places. An embedded mapping in a flow sequence is parsed again for every scalar appended to it, and so are the collections nested in it, so the parse time grows exponentially with the nesting depth. The patterns matching mapping keys and tags scan a run of spaces once per character of the run, and each scalar of a flow collection is matched against a copy of the rest of the collection, so the parse time grows quadratically with the size of the input. Nested blocks are also copied at each nesting level, which consumes memory as well as time. A few other constructs, such as an empty sequence item followed by a blank line or an anchor named 0, trigger similar repeated work.
Any code parsing untrusted YAML is affected, with the default flags. In Symfony 7.4 and later, that includes #[MapRequestPayload] when the Yaml component is installed and the endpoint does not restrict acceptFormat. A single unauthenticated request with a YAML content type keeps a PHP worker busy until max_execution_time. JSON documents are valid YAML, so a JSON payload sent with a YAML content type is enough for the flow collection case. In Symfony 6.4, #[MapRequestPayload] accepts YAML only when the application registers a yaml request format. |
| A flaw was found in jwcrypto. The JWK.import_key() function validates the key_ops JWK member for duplicate values using an algorithm with O(n^2) time complexity, and the length of key_ops is not bounded. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can supply a JWK with a large key_ops array to an application that passes attacker-controlled key material to a public key-import API (reachable via ECDH-ES key agreement, OIDC dynamic client registration, DPoP, or ACME account key registration, among others) to consume excessive CPU time, resulting in a denial of service. |
| An algorithmic complexity flaw exists in libsoup's HTTP Range header processing that persists after the CVE-2025-32907 fix.
CVE-2025-32907 addressed memory amplification when a client repeated the same range many times in a single Range header. Commit 9bb92f7a corrected merge correctness in soup_message_headers_get_ranges_internal() in libsoup/soup-message-headers.c, but the coalescing loop still removes merged ranges using g_array_remove_index() for each coalesced element. Because GArray is contiguous, each mid-array removal performs an O(N) memmove. When many identical satisfiable ranges are supplied (for example bytes=0-0 repeated thousands of times), the loop performs O(N²) work coalescing them into a single range.
The vulnerable path is reachable server-side from handle_partial_get() in libsoup/server/http1/soup-server-message-io-http1.c when a SoupServer handler returns HTTP 200 with a non-empty body. No authentication is required. The number of ranges is bounded only by the maximum request header size (~100 KiB), allowing roughly 25,000 ranges per request. Reporter measurements on libsoup HEAD containing the CVE-2025-32907 fix show ~90 ms single-core CPU per such request at the wire maximum, blocking the server's event loop for that duration.
This is a CPU exhaustion / availability issue only. No memory corruption or information disclosure occurs.
Affected: libsoup versions containing the CVE-2025-32907 fix but not merge request !550.
Fixed upstream: MR !550 merged 2026-08-20, replacing per-element removal with O(N) in-place compaction and rejecting Range headers requesting more than 200 ranges.
Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/538
Related: CVE-2025-32907 |
| MIME::Words versions before 5.521 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via repeated "=?" sequences in decode_mimewords.
For each "=?" that does not start a complete encoded word, decode_mimewords appends an error message containing the whole input string to $@. A boundary of 8,000 "=?" pairs (16,000 bytes) adds 8,000 copies of itself to $@, about 128 MB.
From version 5.518, MIME::Parser decodes every multipart boundary this way, so a remote sender can exhaust the memory of the parsing process with one Content-Type header. |
| MIME::Parser versions before 5.521 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via indented error messages from a truncated, deeply nested message.
Each stored parser diagnostic is indented by three spaces per nesting level. When a message nested N levels deep ends without its closing boundaries, every level logs an error at its own depth, so the stored diagnostics grow with the square of N. The defaults place no limit on nesting depth. |
| HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic rescanning of a multipart body with a missing or malformed boundary.
Before the first part, and between parts, the multipart parser searches the whole buffered body for the next boundary. On a miss it keeps everything and searches again from the start when the next chunk arrives. A body with no boundary, or with a delimiter followed by neither CRLF nor "--", is therefore rescanned on every chunk, taking time quadratic in its size.
A remote attacker can exhaust worker CPU with a few such requests. |
| Kyverno before 1.19.2 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows namespaced policy authors to exhaust admission controller CPU by submitting pathological wildcard patterns. Attackers can create a Policy with crafted match and exclude names evaluated by ValidateMatchExcludeConflict, pinning cores and causing cluster-wide webhook timeouts that block resource operations. |
| A flaw was found in GnuTLS. This vulnerability allows a denial of service (DoS) by excessive CPU (Central Processing Unit) and memory consumption via specially crafted malicious certificates containing a large number of name constraints and subject alternative names (SANs). |
| A flaw was found in GnuTLS, which relies on libtasn1 for ASN.1 data processing. Due to an inefficient algorithm in libtasn1, decoding certain DER-encoded certificate data can take excessive time, leading to increased resource consumption. This flaw allows a remote attacker to send a specially crafted certificate, causing GnuTLS to become unresponsive or slow, resulting in a denial-of-service condition. |
| A flaw in libtasn1 causes inefficient handling of specific certificate data. When processing a large number of elements in a certificate, libtasn1 takes much longer than expected, which can slow down or even crash the system. This flaw allows an attacker to send a specially crafted certificate, causing a denial of service attack. |
| One CBOR-parsing issue in jackson-dataformats-binary's CBOR module: an unbounded run of CBOR tags drives quadratic-time TagList growth (CPU/GC-exhaustion DoS, PoC-proven).
PoC executed against com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-cbor:2.18.2; present in current 2.x and 3.x (tools.jackson.dataformat.cbor) HEAD. Distinct from the Avro and Smile/Protobuf advisories for this repo.
Quadratic CPU/GC DoS from an unbounded chain of CBOR tags (PoC-proven). File: cbor/src/main/java/.../cbor/CBORParser.java (tag handling -> TagList).
CBOR permits a data item to be preceded by any number of semantic tags. The CBOR parser accumulates them in a TagList whose backing array grows by a fixed increment (+8), not by doubling, and re-scans/copies on each growth. An attacker sends a value preceded by a long run of tag bytes; the fixed-increment growth makes accumulating N tags O(N^2) in time (plus GC pressure), with no cap on the number of stacked tags.
PoC (executed, JDK 17): feeding a CBOR stream consisting of a long run of tag bytes (e.g. tag 0xC0+) before a trivial value forces quadratic CPU/GC; parse time grows super-linearly with the tag count, pinning a request thread with no configurable limit.
Impact. Algorithmic-complexity denial of service (CWE-407): a modest input of stacked tags consumes quadratic CPU/GC, pinning a request thread; concurrent requests exhaust the pool.
Fix. Grow TagList by doubling and/or cap the number of stacked tags (StreamReadConstraints-style). |
| When coalescing adjacent text nodes in addText and fosterParent, appending to an existing TextNode's Data via string concatenation (n.Data += text) reallocated and copied the accumulated string on every token. Inputs containing many short text runs separated by ignored end tags (such as "a</x>") caused O(n^2) allocations and byte copies. Accumulate coalesced text in per-node byte slices during parsing and materialize Data strings once at the end of parse. |
| rsync before 3.5.2 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the delta-transfer sender's hash_search() in match.c that allows malicious receivers to trigger unbounded strong-checksum work at consecutive offsets. Unauthenticated attackers pulling from a public daemon module can supply weak checksums colliding with consecutive rolling windows plus non-matching strong checksums, exhausting sender CPU across concurrent connections. |
| js-toml is a TOML parser for JavaScript, fully compliant with the TOML 1.0.0 Spec. Versions up to and including 1.1.1 parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is O(n²) in the literal length. The lexer regex places no upper bound on the literal length, so a single TOML document containing one ~500 kB hex literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop (Apple M-series, Node v22). Memory amplification is bounded but CPU amplification is severe and grows quadratically: doubling the literal length quadruples the work. A caller that invokes `load()` on attacker-controlled TOML (configuration upload endpoints, CI/CD systems ingesting third-party `*.toml`, IDE plugins, build tools) is exposed to a single-request CPU exhaustion DoS. Version 1.1.2 fixes the issue. |
| Python-Markdown 3.0 through 3.11.2 contains an algorithmic complexity vulnerability in inline link parsing that allows remote attackers to exhaust CPU through unmatched brackets. Attackers can submit short Markdown containing repeated [ or 