| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand().
The secret that signs session cookies is built from two calls to the built-in rand(), which is seeded with 32 bits. The secret therefore has at most 2**32 possible values, and one signed cookie is enough to test each candidate offline.
An attacker who obtains a single session cookie can recover the secret and sign cookies for any user, including an administrator. |
| In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions 6.0 through 6.5.2.202603a, the NetX Secure DTLS server fills HelloVerifyRequest cookies from NX_RAND(), by default the C library rand(), with no key and no binding to the client. An attacker who can predict the generator's output can pass the cookie exchange from a spoofed address and make the server send its handshake flight to a victim, using it as a traffic reflector. |
| Cotonti through 1.0.0 generates registration and email-change validation tokens with md5(microtime()), allowing attackers to bypass email-ownership verification by predicting tokens. Attackers can derive the generation time from the HTTP Date header and compute candidate tokens offline. They then submit these tokens to the users.register.php validate handler to activate accounts or confirm email addresses they do not control. |
| Ado::Sessions versions through 0.935 for Perl generates insecure session ids.
The session id is generated from a SHA-1 hash seeded with the built-in rand function, the epoch time, and the PID. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Note that Ado is no longer maintained, and has been removed from the CPAN index. It is still available on BackPAN. |
| Amon2::Plugin::Web::CSRFDefender versions from 7.00 through 7.03 for Perl generate an insecure session id.
The generate_session_id function will attempt to read bytes from the /dev/urandom device, but if that is unavailable then it generates bytes using SHA-1 hash seeded with the built-in rand() function, the PID, and the high resolution epoch time. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
Amon2::Plugin::Web::CSRFDefender versions before 7.00 were part of Amon2, which was vulnerable to insecure session ids due to CVE-2025-15604.
Note that the author has deprecated this module. |
| OpenSSL 0.9.8c-1 up to versions before 0.9.8g-9 on Debian-based operating systems uses a random number generator that generates predictable numbers, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct brute force guessing attacks against cryptographic keys. |
| The get_random_int function in drivers/char/random.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.30 produces insufficiently random numbers, which allows attackers to predict the return value, and possibly defeat protection mechanisms based on randomization, via vectors that leverage the function's tendency to "return the same value over and over again for long stretches of time." |
| The QNAP TS-239 Pro and TS-639 Pro with firmware 2.1.7 0613, 3.1.0 0627, and 3.1.1 0815 use the rand library function to generate a certain recovery key, which makes it easier for local users to determine this key via a brute-force attack. |
| cgi-bin/makecgi-pro in Iomega StorCenter Pro generates predictable session IDs, which allows remote attackers to hijack active sessions and gain privileges via brute force guessing attacks on the session_id parameter. |
| The Net::EasyTCP package before 0.15 for Perl always uses Perl's builtin rand(), which is not a strong random number generator, for cryptographic keys. |
| The Crypt::Random::Source package before 0.13 for Perl has a fallback to the built-in rand() function, which is not a secure source of random bits. |
| Vision UI is a collection of enterprise-grade, dependency-free modules for modern web projects. In versions 1.4.0 and below, the getSecureRandomInt function in security-kit versions prior to 3.5.0 (packaged in Vision-ui <= 1.4.0) contains a critical cryptographic weakness. Due to a silent 32-bit integer overflow in its internal masking logic, the function fails to produce a uniform distribution of random numbers when the requested range between min and max is larger than 2³². The root cause is the use of a 32-bit bitwise left-shift operation (<<) to generate a bitmask for the rejection sampling algorithm. This causes the mask to be incorrect for any range requiring 32 or more bits of entropy. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.0. |
| Crypt::CBC versions between 1.21 and 3.05 for Perl may use the rand() function as the default source of entropy, which is not cryptographically secure, for cryptographic functions.
This issue affects operating systems where "/dev/urandom'" is unavailable. In that case, Crypt::CBC will fallback to use the insecure rand() function. |
| Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Before 2.52.11, on Go versions prior to 1.24, the underlying crypto/rand implementation can return an error if secure randomness cannot be obtained. Because no error is returned by the Fiber v2 UUID functions, application code may unknowingly rely on predictable, repeated, or low-entropy identifiers in security-critical pathways. This is especially impactful because many Fiber v2 middleware components (session middleware, CSRF, rate limiting, request-ID generation, etc.) default to using utils.UUIDv4(). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.52.11. |
| An issue was discovered in Joomla! 3.2.0 through 3.9.24. Usage of the insecure rand() function within the process of generating the 2FA secret. |
| OleumTech WIO DH2 Wireless Gateway and Sensor Wireless I/O Modules rely exclusively on a time value for entropy in key generation, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by predicting the time of project creation. |
| A use of a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator vulnerability in the authenticator of the Identity Based Encryption service of FortiMail 6.4.0 through 6.4.4, and 6.2.0 through 6.2.7 may allow an unauthenticated attacker to infer parts of users authentication tokens and reset their credentials. |
| In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DSA key pair generator generates a weak private key if used with default values. If the JCA key pair generator is not explicitly initialised with DSA parameters, 1.55 and earlier generates a private value assuming a 1024 bit key size. In earlier releases this can be dealt with by explicitly passing parameters to the key pair generator. |
| The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability |
| An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9. Improper Random Secret Generation occurs because Math.Random() is used by pretty Easy privacy (pEp), aka TBE-01-001. |
