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Search Results (2 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-119152 | 2 Latepoint, Wordpress-extensions | 2 Appointment Booking Plugin – Latepoint | Calendar & Scheduling For Wordpress, Appointment Booking Plugin | 2026-11-07 | 5.4 Medium |
| The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'customer[email] (inside params)' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. An unauthenticated visitor can exploit this by registering as a LatePoint customer via the public booking form — receiving an active customer session with no WordPress account — and then submitting a quoted local-part email address containing an HTML payload (e.g. a tag with no spaces) that passes FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL but is stored and rendered unescaped. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118066 | 2 Latepoint, Wordpress-extensions | 2 Appointment Booking Plugin – Latepoint | Calendar & Scheduling For Wordpress, Appointment Booking Plugin | 2026-11-07 | 9.1 Critical |
| The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6. This is due to the `OsModel::build_conditions_query()` function in `lib/models/model.php` comparing WHERE-clause values against the literal strings `'IS NULL'` and `'IS NOT NULL'` and concatenating a match directly into SQL without binding it as a parameter, a flaw that neither `sanitize_text_field()` nor the 5.7.5 `is_scalar()` hardening guard closes, since both pass the scalar sentinel through unchanged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send `params[password_reset_token]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `customer_cabinet__change_password` AJAX route to match every non-null `account_nonse` value, resolving to the lowest-id customer and overwriting that customer's password to an attacker-chosen value — granting full access to their bookings, orders, and PII, and, when the `wp_users_as_customers` option is enabled, takeover of the linked WordPress subscriber or customer-role account. The attacker can first identify the target customer's email by sending `params[order_intent_key]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `steps__start_from_order_intent` route, which returns the name and email from the first matching order intent, and can then self-arm the required 15-minute password-reset freshness window by triggering a reset for that customer directly. | ||||
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