| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Improper exception handling in IOMMU could allow an invalidate command to be sent to PCIe devices that do not support Address Translation Cache (ATC), potentially resulting in denial of service. |
| Improper validation of specified quantities in input within AMD Power Management Firmware (PMFW) could allow a local attacker to pass unsanitized input, potentially resulting in a system crash or denial of service. |
| Improper validation of consistency within input in AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) firmware could allow an attacker with administrative privileges to create multiple RMP entries for the same guest physical address, potentially resulting in loss of guest integrity. |
| Use after free in PostgreSQL COPY FROM error reporting allows a database user to disclose portions of server memory, via a longer input row following an ignored or nullified conversion error. file_fdw reaches the same code path in affected version 18. Within major versions 17-18, minor versions before PostgreSQL 18.7 and 17.12 are affected. Versions before PostgreSQL 17 are unaffected. |
| Inconsistent transition-capture state in PostgreSQL MERGE allows a table data modifier to make an AFTER trigger process the wrong new row, via a partitioned table MERGE that performs an INSERT before an UPDATE. Within major versions 15-18, minor versions before PostgreSQL 18.7, 17.12, 16.16, and 15.20 are affected. Versions before PostgreSQL 15 are unaffected. |
| Untrusted search path in PostgreSQL vacuumdb allows a database owner to execute arbitrary SQL as the database user running vacuumdb, via shadowing operators used in the --missing-stats-only catalog query. The pg_upgrade documentation recommends an affected vacuumdb invocation. Within major version 18, minor versions before PostgreSQL 18.7 are affected. Versions before PostgreSQL 18 are unaffected. |
| Improper input validation in PostgreSQL pg_restore allows a non-plain archive provider to execute arbitrary code as the operating system user running pg_restore, via a crafted archive. Note a contrast: crafted archive data may legitimately cause arbitrary SQL to execute at the restore destination, but it does not legitimately confer arbitrary code execution in the pg_restore OS process. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.7, 17.12, 16.16, 15.20, and 14.25 are affected. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in PostgreSQL tsvector_delete() allows a database user to execute arbitrary code as the operating system user running the database, via a tsvector whose lexeme data uses a nonstandard but valid ordering that requires additional alignment padding in the result. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.7, 17.12, 16.16, 15.20, and 14.25 are affected. |
| SQL injection in PostgreSQL reindexdb allows an object creator to execute arbitrary SQL as the database user running reindexdb, via a crafted index name embedded in the parallel catalog query for --jobs with --index. Within major versions 17-18, minor versions before PostgreSQL 18.7 and 17.12 are affected. Versions before PostgreSQL 17 are unaffected. |
| Type confusion in PostgreSQL materialized set-returning functions allows a database user to execute arbitrary code as the operating system user running the database, via returning rows having different dynamic RECORD return types. json_populate_recordset() is one affected function. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.7, 17.12, 16.16, 15.20, and 14.25 are affected. |
| Type confusion in PostgreSQL anonymous RECORD types allows an object creator to execute arbitrary code as the operating system user running the database, via row types having dropped attributes in the same positions but with different widths or alignments. Within major versions 17-18, minor versions before PostgreSQL 18.7 and 17.12 are affected. Versions before PostgreSQL 17 are unaffected. |
| The MCUboot TLV iterator bootutil_tlv_iter_next() in boot/bootutil/src/tlv.c walks image trailer TLVs with a single loop guard (it->tlv_off < it->tlv_end) and advances by sizeof(struct image_tlv) + tlv.it_len using the attacker-controlled it_len field, without validating that the entry's header or payload stays within it->tlv_end. As a result the 4-byte header read can extend up to 3 bytes past the declared TLV area, and the returned (off, len) can describe a payload that runs past it.
The path is pre-authentication: TLVs are parsed during bootutil_img_validate() before the signature is verified, and a crafted image can be presented through DFU / serial-recovery / OTA. However the impact is contained by surrounding guards: bootutil_img_validate() first rejects a TLV area larger than bootutil_max_image_size(), the default LOAD_IMAGE_DATA sink is flash_area_read() which bounds-checks against the flash partition and fails an out-of-partition read, and every payload consumer (EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, EXPECTED_KEY_TLV, EXPECTED_SIG_TLV, IMAGE_TLV_SEC_CNT) clamps len against a fixed buffer before copying.
The residual effect in a default flash build is therefore an out-of-region read confined to the attacker's own slot partition whose result is never observable, yielding at worst a clean validation failure rather than memory corruption or information disclosure. A genuine (though still bounded) out-of-bounds read remains under the non-default MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD configuration, where LOAD_IMAGE_DATA is an unchecked memcpy. The fix is to validate each entry's header and payload against it->tlv_end inside the iterator. |
| MCUboot's serial-recovery image-upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c declares const struct flash_area *fap = NULL and assigns it only via flash_area_open() part-way through the function. Two early validation failures (goto out_invalid_data) — a CBOR map that fails to decode, or an upload packet missing the off/data members — branch past the open while fap is still NULL, then fall into the shared epilogue. In MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES builds that epilogue unconditionally calls boot_handle_enc_fw(fap), which reaches boot_image_load_header() and flash_area_read() and dereferences the NULL flash_area.
The defect is reachable pre-authentication: the trigger is the very first serial-recovery upload command carrying a malformed payload. The guarding conditions are default-true on a fresh recovery session — img_num, curr_off and img_size are zero-initialized statics, so curr_off == img_size and the primary-slot test both hold. It requires a non-default build: encrypted images (MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES / Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE) together with an active serial-recovery transport, on the Zephyr or Mynewt port (the two that build both boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c and boot_serial_encryption.c with MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES).
The impact is a transient denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. fap is a hard NULL rather than an attacker-controlled value, so there is no memory-corruption or information-leak primitive and image authentication is unaffected. Whether the dereference faults is platform-dependent — on targets where address 0x0 is mapped readable flash the read merely returns an error and execution continues, while targets that trap NULL (MPU / null-pointer-exception detection) take a hard fault. Because serial recovery is unauthenticated by design and already permits the console attacker to write the secondary slot, the added capability is only a low-value transient crash.
The related unconditional flash_area_close(fap) call in the same epilogue is a safe no-op on the ports that reach it, so it does not contribute to the dereference.
The affected ports are the Zephyr port — boot/zephyr/CMakeLists.txt compiles boot_serial.c under CONFIG_MCUBOOT_SERIAL and boot_serial_encryption.c under CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE — and the Mynewt port, whose mcuboot_config.h defines MCUBOOT_SERIAL unconditionally and MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES under any BOOTUTIL_ENCRYPT_ syscfg, with boot/boot_serial/pkg.yml declaring no explicit source list so the whole directory is built. The Espressif port is not affected**: it compiles boot_serial.c but not boot_serial_encryption.c, and defines no MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES, so the #ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES block containing the call is preprocessed away. The NuttX, Cypress and Mbed ports do not build boot_serial.c at all. |
| split_image_check() in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c declares a fixed uint8_t loader_hash[32] buffer and passes it as the out_hash out-parameter to bootutil_img_validate(). That routine copies IMAGE_HASH_SIZE bytes into out_hash (memcpy(out_hash, hash, IMAGE_HASH_SIZE) in boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c), where IMAGE_HASH_SIZE is a compile-time constant of 64 for MCUBOOT_SHA512 or 48 for MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384/SHA-384 (boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/sha.h). The buffer tracks SHA-256 (32 bytes) while the copy length tracks the configured algorithm, so the write overruns the buffer by 16 or 32 bytes.
The overflow is only present in a non-default configuration: the legacy Mynewt split-image feature must be compiled (split_go()/split_image_check(), i.e. neither MCUBOOT_DIRECT_XIP nor MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD), the digest must be larger than 32 bytes (MCUBOOT_SHA512 or MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384), and MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE must be off. split_go() is a public API with no caller inside MCUboot; it is invoked from a Mynewt application. In the default SHA-256 build there is no overflow.
The over-written bytes are the one-way digest of the loader image and the overflow length is fixed at build time, so the contents are not meaningfully attacker-controlled and the size is not attacker-chosen. The realistic impact is bounded, uncontrolled corruption of the bootloader's stack on the split-boot path, manifesting as instability or failed boot in the affected configuration rather than reliable code execution. The fix is to size loader_hash to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE and pass IMAGE_HASH_SIZE as the matching seed length. |
| When MCUboot is built with the TinyCrypt crypto backend (MCUBOOT_USE_TINYCRYPT), bootutil_aes_ctr_drop() in boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/aes_ctr_tinycrypt.h was an empty stub. The AES-CTR context for this backend is the fully expanded AES-128 key schedule (struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct). Generic code relies on this hook to release and clear key state, so with TinyCrypt nothing was cleared. The mbedTLS and PSA backends do free or destroy their key state here.
As a result, boot_state_clear(), which boot_go() calls before handing off to the application, left the image's AES content-encryption key schedule in the static boot_data state. This is the case after an encrypted upgrade in single-image builds, where boot_enc_zeroize() is not called. boot_decrypt_key() likewise left the ECIES-derived key-encryption key schedule on the stack. The affected build uses MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES with TinyCrypt, which is the default ECDSA and Ed25519 backend in the Zephyr port.
The first AES-128 round key equals the cipher key, so anyone who can read the leftover bootloader RAM after boot can recover the image content key and decrypt that encrypted image. That includes a physical attacker with debug or RAM access, or code later running on the device. This weakens image-encryption key confidentiality (and so the confidentiality of the encrypted image's plaintext). The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed, and image authenticity is not affected. The fix wipes the context with bootutil_wipe_memory(). |
| In MCUboot's serial-recovery encrypted-image support (boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial_encryption.c), decrypt_image_inplace() and boot_image_validate_encrypted() each keep a stack-local struct boot_status. boot_enc_load() writes the plaintext per-image AES key into its enckey[] field. Neither function cleared this structure before returning. In addition, a decrypt failure inside the per-sector loop of decrypt_image_inplace() returned early and skipped the total_out: cleanup, which left the expanded AES key context (enc_data) on the stack as well. The error paths of boot_image_validate_encrypted() similarly skipped boot_enc_zeroize().
The affected code is built when encrypted images (MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES, Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE) are combined with serial recovery. It runs when an encrypted image is uploaded to the primary slot over the recovery protocol, and when the image list or state is queried while an encrypted image is in the secondary slot. After these functions return, the image's AES content key remains in dead stack memory. An attacker who can later read device RAM, for example through a debug port or retained RAM, can recover it.
This weakens the confidentiality of image-encryption keys within the bootloader trust boundary. A recovered key exposes the plaintext of the encrypted firmware image it protects. The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed. No remote or recovery-protocol channel that returns this memory is known, so exploitation requires a separate memory-read capability. |
| In OpenStack Nova before 33.0.2, the server create API does not strip certain hint data. The resulting instance has no Placement allocation. |
| Improper validation of Reverse Map Table (RMP) entries in the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a privileged attacker to trigger concurrent modifications to RMP entries without proper synchronization potentially resulting in loss of data integrity. |
| A time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in the AMD SEV Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow an attacker with administrative privileges to bypass security checks on scatter lists, potentially resulting in loss of guest integrity. |
| Improper handling of overlap between protected memory ranges in the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a privileged attacker to cause misconfigurations in the RMP potentially resulting in loss of integrity. |
