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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-9771 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-04 | 8.8 High |
| The flash_copy() system call is verified by z_vrfy_flash_copy() in drivers/flash/flash_util.c. On builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, this handler is the kernel-side trust boundary for a user-mode caller. Prior to the fix it validated only the output buffer (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE) and passed the two struct device * arguments, src_dev and dst_dev, directly into the implementation without any object validation — unlike every sibling flash syscall, which guards its device pointer with K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_FLASH. A user-mode thread fully controls the values of src_dev/dst_dev and the contents of its own address space. The implementation z_impl_flash_copy() dereferences these pointers and calls through their driver-API function tables (e.g. api->get_parameters(dst_dev), flash_read(src_dev, ...), flash_write(dst_dev, ...)). By supplying a pointer to a forged struct device whose api table contains attacker-chosen function pointers, an unprivileged thread can cause the kernel to call arbitrary code in supervisor mode; passing any arbitrary or invalid address otherwise yields a kernel crash or out-of-bounds read. The result is a local privilege escalation out of the userspace sandbox (with kernel denial-of-service and information disclosure as lesser outcomes). The fix adds K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_FLASH(src_dev, read) and K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_FLASH(dst_dev, write) to z_vrfy_flash_copy(), which verify each device is a registered flash-driver kernel object the calling thread is permitted to use before any dereference, closing the path completely. | ||||
| CVE-2026-95210 | 1 Gnu | 1 Gnutls | 2026-11-04 | 4.8 Medium |
| GnuTLS v3.8.13 does not reject a critical keyUsage extension when it cannot be processed, such as when extnValue is an ASN.1 NULL (05 00) instead of a BIT STRING. NOTE: the Supplier does not consider this an actionable security vulnerability because of its "threat model doesn't consider attacks only possible by modifying anything within the trust boundary (private keys, trusted certificate authorities and their issued certificates including intermediate CAs, etc.)" policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-95209 | 1 Gnu | 1 Gnutls | 2026-11-04 | N/A |
| ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: none. | ||||
| CVE-2026-95184 | 1 Gnu | 1 Gnutls | 2026-11-04 | 5.9 Medium |
| GnuTLS v3.8.13 does not properly enforce name constraints, as demonstrated by a permitted subtree violation for "EE O=Evil accepted although outside permitted O=Good." NOTE: the Supplier does not consider this an actionable security vulnerability because of its "threat model doesn't consider attacks only possible by modifying anything within the trust boundary (private keys, trusted certificate authorities and their issued certificates including intermediate CAs, etc.)" policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88648 | 1 Gnu | 1 Gnutls | 2026-11-04 | 3.7 Low |
| In GnuTLS v3.8.13, an excluded msUPN/SRV otherName is never checked. NOTE: the Supplier does not consider this an actionable security vulnerability because of its "threat model doesn't consider attacks only possible by modifying anything within the trust boundary (private keys, trusted certificate authorities and their issued certificates including intermediate CAs, etc.)" policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88647 | 1 Gnu | 1 Gnutls | 2026-11-04 | 6.5 Medium |
| GnuTLS v3.8.13 can perhaps unexpectedly trust a certificate on the basis of Common Name when Subject Alternative Name has an SRV otherName (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7) whose value is an OCTET STRING. NOTE: the Supplier does not consider this an actionable security vulnerability because of its "threat model doesn't consider attacks only possible by modifying anything within the trust boundary (private keys, trusted certificate authorities and their issued certificates including intermediate CAs, etc.)" policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75084 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-04 | 6.8 Medium |
| The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len < 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped. An unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required. With the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf->data and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75083 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-04 | 5.9 Medium |
| The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len - KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register — a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air — and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255. Because the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio's PKT_BUFFER_RX register array. The length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time — before frame filtering has completed — while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets' data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact. The fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-67693 | 1 Gnu | 1 Gnutls | 2026-11-04 | 3.7 Low |
| GnuTLS v3.8.13 does not reject end-entity X.509 certificates that contain a contradictory combination of Key Usage (KU) and Extended Key Usage (EKU). NOTE: the Supplier does not consider this an actionable security vulnerability because of its "threat model doesn't consider attacks only possible by modifying anything within the trust boundary (private keys, trusted certificate authorities and their issued certificates including intermediate CAs, etc.)" policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12632 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-04 | 6.5 Medium |
| Zephyr's Precision Time Protocol receive handler ptp_msg_post_recv() in subsys/net/lib/ptp/msg.c takes the 4-bit message type straight off the wire via ptp_msg_type() (msg->header.type_major_sdo_id & 0xF, range 0-15) and uses it to index the msg_size[] table. That table only defines entries up to PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT (0xD), giving it ARRAY_SIZE == 14. Before the fix there was no upper-bound check, so the undefined types 0xE and 0xF indexed one or two int slots past the end of the array — an out-of-bounds read of adjacent read-only data. The out-of-bounds value is then reused as a length: it gates msg_size[type] > cnt, and when it is small or negative it makes cnt - msg_size[type] a large positive budget passed to msg_tlv_post_recv(), whose TLV loop then walks the message suffix past the received bytes, performing further out-of-bounds reads and in-place byte-swap writes on memory beyond the message slab. The defect is reached directly from the network: ptp_port_event_gen() in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c reads a PTP frame with ptp_transport_recv() and calls ptp_msg_post_recv() with the attacker-chosen type. PTP uses UDP multicast or raw Ethernet (0x88F7) and is unauthenticated, so any host on the same link can trigger the indexing on a CONFIG_PTP-enabled node with no preconditions. The reliably reproducible impact is a denial of service (fault/crash); a limited memory-corruption path exists but depends on the build-specific value adjacent to msg_size[], which the attacker cannot tune. The fix rejects type >= ARRAY_SIZE(msg_size) with -EBADMSG before any indexing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12631 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-04 | 6.5 Medium |
| The Zephyr kernel validates the k_thread_join() and k_thread_abort() system calls (declared __syscall in include/zephyr/kernel.h) through thread_obj_validate() in kernel/thread.c. Its default switch branch is the access-denied path, taken when k_object_validate() returns -EPERM (the calling user thread was never granted access to the target thread object) or -EBADF (the supplied pointer is not a registered kernel object of the right type). That branch invoked K_OOPS(K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG(ret, "access denied")), but K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG treats a true expression as success; the non-zero error code ret therefore read as "verified OK", the kernel oops was never raised, and control fell through to CODE_UNREACHABLE. Because k_thread_join() and k_thread_abort() are system calls, an unprivileged user-mode thread (under CONFIG_USERSPACE) can reach this denial path directly by calling either syscall on a thread object it does not own. Instead of the offending thread being cleanly terminated, execution reaches __builtin_unreachable() while running in supervisor mode inside the syscall handler. On Clang builds CODE_UNREACHABLE emits an illegal-instruction trap, so a user thread can deterministically crash the kernel — a locally triggerable denial of service that escapes the userspace sandbox. On GCC builds the path is undefined behavior: the compiler may drop the return-value handling for thread_obj_validate(), so it can return an undefined bool; if that is false, the caller proceeds into the real k_thread_join()/k_thread_abort() implementation for a thread the user was never authorized to access, an access-control bypass. The fix changes the verification expression to ret == 0, so a denied (non-zero) result now correctly raises K_OOPS and terminates the offending caller. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12629 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-04 | 4.6 Medium |
| The ARM PL011 UART driver in drivers/serial/uart_pl011.c fails to acknowledge receive error interrupts. On the PL011, the framing, parity, break, and overrun error interrupts (PL011_IMSC_ERROR_MASK) are cleared only by writing the interrupt-clear register UARTICR; reading the data register clears the RX interrupt and the per-byte RSR status but not the error interrupt status in MIS. The interrupt service routine pl011_isr() acknowledged only the CTS modem-status interrupt and never wrote icr for the error bits, so an asserted error interrupt remains pending after the ISR returns. When an application enables error-interrupt reporting via the public uart_irq_err_enable() API, an attacker who controls the serial peer can deterministically assert these error bits by injecting line errors on the RX line — a baud/stop-bit mismatch or mid-character break (framing/break error), a flipped parity bit (parity error), or FIFO flooding (overrun error). Because the error interrupt is never cleared, the interrupt line stays asserted and the CPU re-enters pl011_isr() immediately and indefinitely, producing an interrupt-storm livelock from which the core makes no forward progress. The impact is an availability-only denial of service (permanent hang), reachable from an external or removable UART peer. Exploitation is gated by configuration: the error interrupt is off by default and no in-tree subsystem enables it, so only applications that explicitly call uart_irq_err_enable() on a PL011-based, interrupt-driven port are affected. The fix makes pl011_isr() acknowledge the pending error bits via uart->icr, breaking the loop, and additionally clears the latched RSR status in pl011_err_check(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-12522 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-04 | 8.8 High |
| The HL7800 cellular modem driver's +CGCONTRDP: response handler on_cmd_atcmdinfo_ipaddr() in drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl7800.c parses the PDP-context dynamic parameters (local address, subnet mask, gateway, and DNS servers) that the cellular network assigns to the device. The response is linearized into a 256-byte stack buffer, after which each address field length is computed from comma/. delimiter positions in the network-supplied data and used directly as the length argument to strncpy() into the fixed 64-byte stack buffer temp_addr_str (and the 16-byte iface_ctx.dns_v4_string). Because the field length is derived from attacker-controlled delimiter positions and was not bounded against the destination buffer, a single field can be far larger than 64 bytes. A malicious or impersonated cellular network (for example a rogue base station) can return a crafted +CGCONTRDP response with an overlong address field, causing strncpy() to write past temp_addr_str on the modem worker thread's stack, plus an out-of-bounds NUL write at temp_addr_str[addr_len]. No device-side privileges or user interaction are required: the device itself issues the AT+CGCONTRDP=1 query during normal network attach and parses whatever the network returns. The overflow corrupts adjacent stack memory in supervisor context, yielding at minimum a remotely triggerable crash and potentially control-flow hijacking on targets without stack protection. The fix bounds every field length against its destination buffer (temp_addr_str and dns_v4_string) before each copy, rejecting overlong fields. | ||||
| CVE-2026-49293 | 1 Sunnyadn | 1 Js-toml | 2026-11-04 | 7.5 High |
| js-toml is a TOML parser for JavaScript, fully compliant with the TOML 1.0.0 Spec. Versions up to and including 1.1.1 parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is O(n²) in the literal length. The lexer regex places no upper bound on the literal length, so a single TOML document containing one ~500 kB hex literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop (Apple M-series, Node v22). Memory amplification is bounded but CPU amplification is severe and grows quadratically: doubling the literal length quadruples the work. A caller that invokes `load()` on attacker-controlled TOML (configuration upload endpoints, CI/CD systems ingesting third-party `*.toml`, IDE plugins, build tools) is exposed to a single-request CPU exhaustion DoS. Version 1.1.2 fixes the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-111754 | 1 Angular | 1 Angular | 2026-11-04 | 6.1 Medium |
| Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 20.3.33, 21.2.25, and 22.2.1, ServerPlatformLocation in Angular server-side rendering checks for protocol-relative URLs before WHATWG URL normalization. A request path containing a popping dot segment followed by multiple slashes can bypass the raw resolveUrl check and normalize to a pathname beginning with two slashes. When Angular SSR detects a mismatch with the router's final location, it can place that pathname in an HTTP Location header, causing a browser to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin. Affected applications use @angular/platform-server and @angular/ssr and either expose compatible parameter or child route shapes or pass user-controlled navigation targets through infrastructure that preserves the relevant dot segments or semicolons. Pure client-side SPAs are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 20.3.33, 21.2.25, and 22.2.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63434 | 1 Franklioxygen | 1 Mytube | 2026-11-04 | 4.3 Medium |
| MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to 1.10.6, when statisticsEnabled and statisticsTrackVisitorActivity are enabled, a visitor-role user can submit events to the statistics ingest endpoint handled by ingestEvents in backend/src/controllers/statisticsController.ts. The handler reads req.body.events and accepts the client-controlled platform, sourceKind, and sessionId fields without server-side derivation or validation before passing the events to the analytics persistence path. A visitor can therefore attribute fabricated events to arbitrary platforms, sources, and sessions, corrupting administrator-visible view counts, download counts, platform breakdowns, source attribution, and session analytics. The server-derived actorRole and surface fields are not forgeable through this issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.6. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82160 | 1 Dell | 1 Wyse Management Suite | 2026-11-04 | 3.3 Low |
| Dell Wyse Management Suite, versions prior to 2609.0.0.155, contain an Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Script injection. | ||||
| CVE-2026-44009 | 2 Patriksimek, Vm2 Project | 2 Vm2, Vm2 | 2026-11-04 | 9.8 Critical |
| vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.2, VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-44008 | 2 Patriksimek, Vm2 Project | 2 Vm2, Vm2 | 2026-11-04 | 9.8 Critical |
| vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.2, the new method neutralizeArraySpeciesBatch works with objects from the other side but can call into this side via getter on the array prototype exposing objects of the wrong side into the sandbox. This can be used to get host objects and get the host Function object. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63475 | 1 Isomorphic-git | 1 Isomorphic-git | 2026-11-04 | 4.3 Medium |
| isomorphic-git is a pure JavaScript implementation of Git for Node.js and browsers. Prior to 1.38.6, isomorphic-git persists server-supplied circular symref= capabilities through updateRemoteRefs, and GitRefManager.resolve() follows the resulting loose symbolic references without a default depth limit or cycle detection. After a clone from a malicious or man-in-the-middle-controlled remote, operations such as log, status, checkout, and branch that resolve refs/remotes/origin/a or refs/remotes/origin/b do not terminate. The circular references remain on disk, leaving the repository unusable for the application and causing a persistent denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.38.6. | ||||