| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wlcore: enable the right set of ciphers
The firmware version number check for IGTK introduced in
commit c34dbc5900b0 ("wifi: wlcore: Add support for IGTK key")
lets the amount of ciphers decrease on every boot of a too old firmware and
that is practically happening. It also does not take into account other
chips than the wl18xx. On some wl128x, the following can be observed
when connecting via nm to a common ap:
[ 484.113311] wlcore: WARNING could not set keys
[ 484.117828] wlcore: ERROR Could not add or replace key
[ 484.123016] wlan0: failed to set key (5, ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) to hardware (-5)
[ 484.123046] wlcore: Hardware recovery in progress. FW ver: Rev 7.3.10.0.142
[ 484.139923] wlcore: pc: 0x0, hint_sts: 0x00000048 count: 1
[ 484.145721] wlcore: down
[ 484.148986] ieee80211 phy0: Hardware restart was requested
[ 484.610473] wlcore: firmware booted (Rev 7.3.10.0.142)
[ 484.633758] wlcore: Association completed.
[ 484.690490] wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 14
[ 484.690490] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 484.700195] WARNING: drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c:872 at wl12xx_queue_recovery_work+0x64/0x74 [wlcore], CPU#0: kworker/0:0/892
This repeats endlessly.
Always disable IGTK on wl12xx and fix the decrementing mess. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: remove napi_synchronize() in igc_down()
When an AF_XDP zero-copy application is killed abruptly, the XSK pool is
torn down but NAPI keeps polling. igc_clean_rx_irq_zc() then returns the
full budget on every poll, so napi_complete_done() never clears
NAPI_STATE_SCHED.
igc_down() calls napi_synchronize() before napi_disable(), so it spins
forever waiting for that bit and the interface never goes down. Drop the
napi_synchronize() and let napi_disable() do the job -- it sets
NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, which forces the stuck poll to complete. Reorder it
ahead of igc_set_queue_napi() so the NAPI mapping is cleared only after
polling has stopped, matching the recent igb fix b1e067240379. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: qcom-geni: fix TX DMA buffer flush
When transmit flushing a qcom-geni UART during an ongoing TX DMA, the
UART gets stuck infinitely repeating corrupted TX DMA frames.
The DMA-mode uart_ops does not provide a flush_buffer callback, so an
in-flight transfer can complete after serial core has reset the transmit
kfifo, underflowing its length and resubmitting page-sized transfers
indefinitely. Add one that stops the transfer and clears tx_remaining
and tx_queued.
The stop path was also broken: it unmapped the buffer while the serial
engine could still read it, and never reset the TX DMA state machine.
Cancel the main sequencer command first, then reset the state machine
and wait for it before unmapping. Drop the early return so a pending
mapping is also cleaned up when the main command is inactive.
The bug can be triggered from userspace with a large write immediately
followed by TCOFLUSH. A following tcdrain will hang forever. The bug was
reproduced and this fix was validated on Arduino Uno Q (QRB2210)
using /dev/ttyHS1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/9p: fix infinite loop in p9_client_rpc on fatal signal
When p9_client_rpc() is called with type P9_TFLUSH and the transport
has no peer (e.g. fd transport backed by pipes with no 9p server),
a fatal signal causes an infinite loop:
again:
err = io_wait_event_killable(req->wq, ...)
/* SIGKILL wakes the task, returns -ERESTARTSYS */
if (err == -ERESTARTSYS && c->status == Connected &&
type == P9_TFLUSH) {
sigpending = 1;
clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
goto again;
}
clear_thread_flag() clears TIF_SIGPENDING before jumping back to
io_wait_event_killable(). signal_pending_state() checks TIF_SIGPENDING,
finds it zero, and the task goes to sleep again. The task can only wake
on the next signal delivery that calls signal_wake_up() and sets
TIF_SIGPENDING again. When that happens the loop repeats, clears
TIF_SIGPENDING, and sleeps again indefinitely.
This is triggered in practice by coredump_wait(): when a thread in a
multi-threaded process causes a coredump (e.g. via SIGSYS from Syscall
User Dispatch), coredump_wait() sends SIGKILL to all other threads and
waits for them to call mm_release(). If one of those threads is blocked
in p9_client_rpc() over an fd transport with no peer, it enters the
P9_TFLUSH loop and never calls mm_release(), so coredump_wait() stalls
forever:
INFO: task syz.0.18:676 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1
task:syz.0.18 state:D stack:27600 pid:676 tgid:673 ppid:630 flags:0x00000004
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5344 [inline]
__schedule+0xcb4/0x5d50 kernel/sched/core.c:6724
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6801 [inline]
schedule+0xe5/0x350 kernel/sched/core.c:6816
schedule_timeout+0x253/0x290 kernel/time/timer.c:2593
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:95 [inline]
__wait_for_common+0x409/0x600 kernel/sched/completion.c:116
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:127 [inline]
wait_for_completion_state+0x1d/0x40 kernel/sched/completion.c:264
coredump_wait fs/coredump.c:448 [inline]
do_coredump+0x854/0x4350 fs/coredump.c:629
get_signal+0x1425/0x2730 kernel/signal.c:2903
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x81/0x880 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xf9/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:218
do_syscall_64+0x102/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Fix: check fatal_signal_pending() before clearing TIF_SIGPENDING in the
P9_TFLUSH retry loop. At that point TIF_SIGPENDING is still set, so
fatal_signal_pending() works correctly. If a fatal signal is pending,
jump to recalc_sigpending to restore TIF_SIGPENDING and return
-ERESTARTSYS to the caller.
The same defect is present in stable kernels back to 5.4. On those
kernels the infinite loop is broken earlier by a second SIGKILL from
the parent process (e.g. kill_and_wait() retrying after a timeout),
resulting in a zombie process and a shutdown delay rather than a
permanent D-state hang, but the underlying flaw is the same.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: cap RESTART_TABLE free-chain walker at rt->used
A crafted NTFS3 disk image triggers an in-kernel infinite loop at
mount time, hanging the mounting thread and firing the soft-lockup
watchdog within ~22s on multi-CPU hosts (panic with
kernel.softlockup_panic=1). The bug is reachable from desktop USB
auto-mount on distributions where udisks2 routes the NTFS signature
to the in-tree ntfs3 driver (Arch family and an increasing fraction
of Fedora / openSUSE / RHEL deployments); CAP_SYS_ADMIN-class manual
mount elsewhere.
check_rstbl()'s second walker iterates the free-entry singly-linked
list headed by rt->first_free with no upper bound on iteration count:
for (off = ff; off;) {
if (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED)
return false;
off = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)Add2Ptr(rt, off));
if (off > ts - sizeof(__le32))
return false;
}
The existing guards cover three exits: end-of-list (off == 0), the
in-use marker (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED), and out-of-bounds
(off > ts - sizeof(__le32)). None of the three prevents an
in-bounds cycle.
A crafted on-disk RESTART_TABLE whose free chain contains a
self-loop or A->B->A cycle whose offsets satisfy:
- in range [sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE), ts - sizeof(__le32)]
- (off - sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE)) % rsize == 0
passes all existing guards and spins the mount-time thread forever.
Reproduced in UML by hand-forging a 2 MB NTFS3 image whose journal
RESTART_TABLE first_free = 0x18 and whose entry at offset 0x18
stores 0x18 as its next pointer; mount of the forged image with
the in-tree ntfs3 driver never returns.
Bound the walker by rt->used. Each entry on a legitimate free
chain is unique, and the total slot count is ne = le16_to_cpu
(rt->used). A traversal that visits more than ne slots is by
construction malformed; reject it as a corrupt RESTART_TABLE.
After this patch, mount of the forged image returns with -EINVAL
and a log_replay failure message, and mkntfs-produced legitimate
images mount cleanly (verified in the same UML harness). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slab: prevent unbounded recursion in free path with new kmalloc type
Commit 280ea9c3154b ("mm/slab: avoid allocating slabobj_ext array from
its own slab") avoided recursive allocation of obj_exts from kmalloc
caches of the same size, by bumping the obj_exts array's allocation
size whenever the array size equals the size of the object being
allocated.
However, as reported by Danielle Costantino and Shakeel Butt,
even slabs from kmalloc caches of different sizes can form a cycle
by allocating obj_exts arrays from each other [1]:
What happened: a KMALLOC_NORMAL slab's obj_exts array (used by
allocation profiling / memcg accounting) is itself kmalloc()'d from a
KMALLOC_NORMAL cache, so the "slab holds another slab's obj_exts array"
relation can form cycles. With sizeof(struct slabobj_ext) == 16 and
the host's geometry:
- kmalloc-512 has 64 objects/slab -> array is 64*16 == 1024 bytes,
served from kmalloc-1k;
- kmalloc-1k has 32 objects/slab -> array is 32*16 == 512 bytes,
served from kmalloc-512.
A kmalloc-512 slab and a kmalloc-1k slab therefore hold each other's
obj_exts array. Discarding one frees the other's array, which empties
and discards that slab, which frees the first's array, and so on:
__free_slab() -> free_slab_obj_exts() -> kfree() -> discard_slab() ->
__free_slab() recurses along the cycle until the stack is exhausted.
With memory allocation profiling, this allows unbounded recursion
in the free path and led to a stack overflow on a production host in
the Meta fleet [1]:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit
Oops: stack guard page
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x8/0x5d0
Call Trace:
__free_slab+0x66/0xc0
kfree+0x3f0/0x5d0
... ( ~125x __free_slab <-> kfree ) ...
<kernel driver freeing a resource>
do_syscall_64
It is proposed [1] to resolve this issue by always serving the obj_exts
array allocation from kmalloc caches (or large kmalloc) of sizes larger
than the object size. However, as pointed out by Vlastimil Babka [2],
this can waste an excessive amount of memory as slabs from large
kmalloc sizes (e.g. kmalloc-8k) generally need obj_exts arrays much
smaller than the object size.
Therefore, rather than bumping the size, let us take a different
approach; disallow formation of cycles between kmalloc types when
allocating obj_exts arrays. Currently, all obj_exts arrays are served
from normal kmalloc caches. Cycles cannot be created if obj_exts arrays
of normal kmalloc caches are served from a special kmalloc type that can
never have obj_exts arrays.
To achieve this, create a new kmalloc type called KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT.
KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT caches are created with SLAB_NO_OBJ_EXT flag when
either 1) memory allocation profiling is not permanently disabled,
or 2) kmalloc types with a priority higher than KMALLOC_CGROUP are
aliased with KMALLOC_NORMAL.
Sheaf bootstrapping for KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT caches now must be deferred
because allocation of a barn can trigger obj_exts array allocation of
normal kmalloc caches when the KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT cache for that size
is not ready yet. For simplicity, perform bootstrapping of sheaves for
all kmalloc caches later.
Introduce a new slab alloc flag, SLAB_ALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT, to prevent
allocation of obj_exts arrays, and let kmalloc_slab() override the type
to KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT when specified. Note that kmalloc_type() remains
unchanged because kmalloc_flags() bypasses the kmalloc fastpath.
Do not pass SLAB_ALLOC_NO_RECURSE to kmalloc_flags() in
alloc_slab_obj_exts() and instead use SLAB_ALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT only when
the objects are allocated from normal kmalloc caches. While this
prevents unbounded recursive allocation of obj_exts, it allows
KMALLOC_NO_OBJ_EXT caches to have sheaves.
Since sheaf allocations specify SLAB_ALLOC_NO_RECURSE that prevents
allocation of both sheaves and obj_exts arrays, the recursion depth
is bounded.
obj_exts arrays for non-
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: xilinx: use FIFO occupancy register to determine buffer size
The method the driver uses to determine the size of the FIFO has a
problem. What it currently does is this:
It stops the SPI hardware and writes to the TX FIFO register until TX
FIFO FULL asserts in the status register. But the hardware does not only
have the FIFO, it also has a shift register which can hold a byte. This
can be seen, when writing a byte to the FIFO (while the SPI hardware is
stopped,) the TX FIFO EMPTY is still empty. So, if we have a FIFO size
of 16 for example, the current method returns a 17.
This is a problem, at least when using the driver in irq mode. The same
size determined for the TX FIFO is also assumed for the RX FIFO. When a
SPI transaction wants to write the amount of the FIFO size or more
bytes, the following happens, for example with 16 bytes FIFO size:
The driver stops the SPI hardware and writes 17 bytes to the TX FIFO and
starts the SPI hardware and goes sleep.
The hardware then shifts out 17 bytes (FIFO + shift register) and
simultaneously reads bytes into the RX FIFO, but it only has 16 places,
so it looses one byte. Then TX FIFO empty asserts, wakes the driver
again, which has a fast path and reads 16 bytes from the RX FIFO, but
before reading the last 17th byte (which is lost) it does this:
sr = xspi->read_fn(xspi->regs + XSPI_SR_OFFSET);
if (!(sr & XSPI_SR_RX_EMPTY_MASK)) {
xilinx_spi_rx(xspi);
rx_words--;
}
It reads the status register and checks if the RX FIFO is not empty.
But it is empty in our case. So this check spins in a while loop
forever locking the driver.
This patch fixes the logic to determine the FIFO size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_bpf: prevent unbounded recursion in offload rollback
Quan Sun reported [1] a stack overflow in cls_bpf_offload_cmd().
Reproducer on netdevsim: add a skip_sw cls_bpf filter, set the
bpf_tc_accept debugfs knob to 0, then `tc filter replace`. The replace
calls tc_setup_cb_replace() which fails. cls_bpf_offload_cmd() then
swaps prog/oldprog and recursively calls itself to roll back. But
bpf_tc_accept=0 makes the rollback fail too, which triggers yet another
rollback frame with the same arguments, and so on until the stack is
exhausted.
bpf_tc_accept is just a convenient knob for the reproducer. Any driver
whose tc_setup_cb_replace() fails twice in a row can hit the same loop,
so this is not a netdevsim-only issue.
Two ways to fix it:
1) Have the rollback call tc_setup_cb_add() on oldprog instead of
re-entering cls_bpf_offload_cmd().
2) Mark the rollback frame with a flag and skip a second-level
rollback from inside it.
Go with (2). It is the smaller change and keeps the original behaviour:
the rollback still goes through tc_setup_cb_replace(), so the driver
gets one real chance to restore its state. If that attempt also fails,
we just return the original error instead of recursing.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ce5a6005-3c5e-4696-9e05-eba9461dc860@std.uestc.edu.cn/T/#u |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix potential infinite loop in rxrpc_recvmsg()
Fix the wait in rxrpc_recvmsg() also take check the oob queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: printer: fix infinite loop in printer_read()
printer_read() uses the same variable for the requested copy size and
the number of bytes actually copied to user space. copy_to_user()
returns the number of bytes not copied, so when it fails to copy
anything, the computed copied length becomes zero.
In that case len, buf, current_rx_bytes and current_rx_buf are left
unchanged. If RX data is available and the user buffer remains
unwritable, the read loop can repeat indefinitely.
Track the copied length separately and return -EFAULT, or the number of
bytes already copied, if an iteration makes no progress. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix infinite loop in __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit
cmd->dumpit callback can return a negative errno, causing an infinite
loop due to the while(len) condition. As the loop never terminates,
genl_mutex is never released, and other tasks waiting on it starve in D
state.
Check dumpit's return value, propagate it and jump to err_out on error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: advance loop vars in cfg80211_merge_profile()
cfg80211_merge_profile() reassembles a Multi-BSSID non-transmitted BSS
profile that has been split across multiple consecutive MBSSID elements.
Its while-loop calls
cfg80211_get_profile_continuation(ie, ielen, mbssid_elem, sub_elem)
but never advances mbssid_elem or sub_elem inside the body. Each
iteration therefore searches for a continuation that follows the same
fixed pair; the helper returns the same next_mbssid; and the same
next_sub bytes are memcpy()'d into merged_ie at a growing offset until
the buffer fills.
Advance both mbssid_elem and sub_elem to the just-consumed continuation
so the next call to cfg80211_get_profile_continuation() searches for a
further continuation beyond it (or returns NULL when none exists).
A specially-crafted malicious beacon can take advantage of this bug
to cause the kernel to spend an excessive amount of time in
cfg80211_merge_profile (up to as much as 2ms per beacon received),
which could theoretically be abused in some way. |
| A flaw was found in dhcpcd's IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisement processing. A specially crafted IPv6 Router Advertisement containing a zero-length Neighbor Discovery option can bypass validation during packet storage and later be reparsed without adequate validation, causing the parser to enter a non-advancing loop. Successful exploitation may result in excessive CPU consumption, leading to a denial of service. |
| .NET Core and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: cfm: reject invalid CCM interval at configuration time
ccm_tx_work_expired() re-arms itself via queue_delayed_work() using
the configured exp_interval converted by interval_to_us(). When
exp_interval is BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_NONE or out of range,
interval_to_us() returns 0, causing the worker to fire immediately in
a tight loop that allocates skbs until OOM.
Fix this by validating exp_interval at configuration time:
- Constrain IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_EXP_INTERVAL to the valid range
[BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_3_3_MS, BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_10_MIN] in the
netlink policy so userspace cannot set an invalid value.
- Reject starting CCM TX in br_cfm_cc_ccm_tx() when exp_interval has
not yet been configured (defaults to 0 from kzalloc). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Break the loop on failure in iommufd_fault_fops_read()
On a copy_to_user() failure inside the inner list_for_each_entry, only the
inner loop breaks; the outer while re-fetches the just-restored fault group
and retries the failing copy_to_user() forever, spinning the reader at 100%
CPU with fault->mutex held.
Check rc after the inner loop and break the outer while as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390: Revert support for DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS
load_unaligned_zeropad() reads eight bytes from unaligned addresses and may
cross page boundaries. It handles exceptions which may happen if reading
from the second page results in an exception.
For pages which are donated to the Ultravisor for secure execution purposes
the do_secure_storage_access() exception handler however does not handle
such exceptions correctly. Such an exception may result in an endless
exception loop which will never be resolved.
An attempt to fix this [1] turned out to be not sufficient. For now revert
load_unaligned_zeropad() until this problem has been resolved in a proper
way.
Note that the implementation of load_unaligned_zeropad() itself is
correct. The revert is just a temporary workaround until there is complete
fix for secure storage access exceptions.
[1] commit b00be77302d7 ("s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the
descriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever
requiring dlen >= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The
named descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked
their per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor
(fip_dtype >= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently
ignore) skipped that check entirely.
An unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could hang
fcoe_ctlr_recv_work on an fcoe, qedf, or bnx2fc initiator indefinitely
by emitting one FIP CVL frame whose single descriptor had fip_dtype ==
FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL and fip_dlen == 0: the cursor advanced zero bytes
per iteration and the loop condition rlen >= sizeof(*desc) stayed true
forever, blocking every subsequent FIP frame on that controller.
Tighten the outer dlen guard to also reject dlen < sizeof(struct
fip_desc), so a malformed descriptor whose length cannot even cover the
descriptor header is rejected before the switch. This is the same
lower-bound the named cases already apply and is the minimum scope that
closes the loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in rt6_fill_node()
Sashiko reported this issue [1]. Apply the same fix as
commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()").
Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings)
without waiting for RCU readers; rt->fib6_siblings.next then still
points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches
&rt->fib6_siblings, causing a CPU stall. fib6_del_route() always
WRITE_ONCE()s rt->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an
inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: layouts: onie-tlv: fix hang on unknown types
The EEPROM on my board has a vendor specific entry of type 0x41. When
stumbling upon that, this driver hangs in an endless loop.
Fix it by keep incrementing the offset on unknown entries, so the loop
will eventually stop. |
