| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix uncancelled rxrpc OOB message handler
Fix AFS to cancel its OOB message processing (typically to respond to
security challenges). Also move OOB message processing to afs_wq so that
it's also waited for and make the OOB handler just return if the net
namespace is no longer live. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers
nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each
parse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf /
nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF
technology-specific parameters are only extracted when
rf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a
zero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and
both handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it:
- discover: nci_add_new_target() -> nci_add_new_protocol();
- activated: nci_target_auto_activated() -> nci_add_new_protocol().
nci_add_new_protocol() uses nfca_poll->nfcid1_len as both a branch
condition and a memcpy() length and copies nfcid1/sens_res/sel_res into
ndev->targets, which is later exposed to user space via NFC_CMD_GET_TARGET.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_ntf_packet+0x25b2/0x3c30
nci_rx_work+0x318/0x5d0
process_scheduled_works+0x84b/0x17a0
worker_thread+0xc10/0x11b0
kthread+0x376/0x500
Local variable ntf.i created at:
nci_ntf_packet+0xbc2/0x3c30
Zero-initialise both on-stack notifications so the union reads back as
zero when no technology-specific parameters are present. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: xilinx-trng - Remove crypto_rng interface
Implementing the crypto_rng interface has no purpose, as it isn't used
in practice. It's being removed from other drivers too. Just remove
it. This leaves hwrng, which is actually used.
Tagging with 'Cc stable' due to the bugs that this removes:
- xtrng_trng_generate() sometimes returned success even when it didn't
fill in all the bytes.
- It was possible for xtrng_trng_generate() and
xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() to run concurrently and interfere with each
other, as the locking code in xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() was broken. |
| An issue was discovered in Lantronix EDS3000PS 3.1.0.0R2. The host parameter of the TFTP client in the Filesystem Browser page is not properly sanitized. This can be exploited to escape from the original command and execute an arbitrary one with root privileges. |
| The administrator password can be changed without knowledge of the current password. When chained with an authentication bypass vulnerability, this issue may allow unauthenticated attackers to modify the administrator password. |
| An issue was discovered in Lantronix EDS5000 2.1.0.0R3. An authenticated attacker can inject OS commands into the "tunnel" parameter when killing a tunnel connection. Injected commands are executed with root privileges. |
| An issue was discovered in Lantronix EDS5000 2.1.0.0R3. An authenticated attacker can inject OS commands into the "name" parameter when deleting SSL credentials through the management interface. Injected commands are executed with root privileges. |
| An issue was discovered in Lantronix EDS5000 2.1.0.0R3. The Log Info page allows users to see log files by specifying their names. Due to a missing sanitization in the file name parameter, an authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary OS commands that are executed with root privileges. |
| An issue was discovered in Lantronix EDS5000 2.1.0.0R3. The SSH Client and SSH Server pages are affected by multiple OS injection vulnerabilities due to missing sanitization of input parameters. An attacker can inject arbitrary commands in delete actions of various objects, such as server keys, users, and known hosts. Commands are executed with root privileges. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: dts: renesas: ironhide: Describe inline ECC carveouts
The DBSC5 DRAM controller protects DRAM content using inline ECC.
The inline ECC utilizes areas of DRAM for its operation, which are
in the DRAM address range, but must not be accessed or modified.
Describe the inline ECC carveout areas used by the DBSC5 controller
on this hardware as reserved-memory, which must not be accessed.
Include DRAM areas which are unprotected by ECC as well, those are
parts of the DRAM which directly precede the ECC carveout.
In case of high DRAM utilization, unless the inline ECC carveouts
are properly reserved, Linux may use and corrupt the memory used
by the DBSC5 DRAM controller for inline ECC, which would lead to
the system becoming unstable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation
End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through
decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner
packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB
before IPv4 interprets skb->cb.
The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and
IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps
IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and
ts.
The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer
extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination
Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the
Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled
Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to
40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees
optlen = 40 and rr = 40.
Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying
when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates
room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The
stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the
Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled
byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte
option-data area.
Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5
kernel both produced:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()
Write of size 255
The relevant End.DX4 call path is:
__ip_options_echo
tcp_v4_route_req
tcp_conn_request
tcp_v4_conn_request
tcp_rcv_state_process
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_v4_rcv
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
ip_local_deliver_finish
ip_local_deliver
input_action_end_dx4_finish
input_action_end_dx4
The relevant End.DT4 call path is:
__ip_options_echo
tcp_v4_route_req
tcp_conn_request
tcp_v4_conn_request
tcp_rcv_state_process
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_v4_rcv
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
ip_local_deliver_finish
ip_local_deliver
input_action_end_dt4
tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so
it does not appear as a separate frame.
When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress
interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing
this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and
End.DT46's IPv4 arm.
Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after
l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master;
IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated()
nci_target_auto_activated() appends a target to the fixed-size array
ndev->targets[NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS] and increments ndev->n_targets
without first checking the array is full; unlike its sibling
nci_add_new_target(), which bails out when n_targets already equals
NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS.
ndev->n_targets is only cleared by nci_clear_target_list(), so an NFCC
that repeatedly re-runs discovery (RF_DISCOVER_RSP, which re-enters
NCI_DISCOVERY without clearing the target list) and reports an
auto-activated target (RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF) drives n_targets past the
limit. The append then writes a struct nfc_target past the end of the
array (a slab out-of-bounds write), and nfc_targets_found() goes on to
walk the array with the inflated count:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]
Write of size 2 at addr ffff0000c7299a18 by task kworker/u8:0/12
Workqueue: nfc0_nci_rx_wq nci_rx_work [nci]
Call trace:
nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]
nci_ntf_packet+0xddc/0x11a0 [nci]
nci_rx_work+0x15c/0x1e0 [nci]
process_one_work+0x2dc/0x500
worker_thread+0x240/0x460
kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1024 bytes to the right of
allocated 1560-byte region [ffff0000c7299000, ffff0000c7299618)
Guard nci_target_auto_activated() with the same check used by
nci_add_new_target(). |
| Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value (CWE-789) in the Prometheus remote_write HTTP handler in Metricbeat can lead Denial of Service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). |
| Hermes Agent 0.18.2 through 0.21.0, fixed in commit f6234d0, contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands by supplying a malicious repository with a crafted .git/config that sets core.fsmonitor to an attacker-controlled command. When a user opens the malicious repository and sends any message, the agent triggers a git status index refresh which executes the injected command in the user's process context, exposing the full environment including configured provider API keys. |
| A pre-authentication OS command injection vulnerability has been identified in Omada gateways configured to operate as an OpenVPN Server due to insufficient validation of client-supplied data during OpenVPN connection establishment. An unauthenticated remote attacker may provide specially crafted input influencing backend command execution logic before authentication completes. Exploitation requires the OpenVPN Server feature to be enabled, VPN service reachable by the attacker and attacker to be able to initiate an OpenVPN connection attempt.
Successful exploitation may allow arbitrary command execution, potentially
leading to full compromise of the affected device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: reload ip header after head reallocation
__ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls skb_ensure_writable() which may
reallocate skb->head. |
| A flaw was found in libssh. A malicious username expanded through %r in ProxyCommand handling can inject shell metacharacters, exposing environment variables and causing unintended shell behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent
[BUG]
Unlinking a refcounted file whose refcount tree has leaf blocks
triggers a fortify panic due to an out-of-bounds write.
[CAUSE]
When the last leaf block is removed from a refcount tree,
ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent() converts the root back to leaf mode
with a bulk memset on &rb->rf_records. rf_records sits in an anonymous
union with rf_list. rf_list.l_tree_depth aliases rf_records.rl_count,
and is 0 for a single-level tree. With rl_count equal to 0, the memset
writes past the 16-byte declared size of rf_records, which the fortify
checker catches.
[FIX]
Replace the bulk memset on &rb->rf_records with a correctly-bounded
memset on rl_recs[] alone, after setting rl_count to the correct value. |
| A improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command ('os command injection') vulnerability in Fortinet FortiADC 7.6.0 through 7.6.1, FortiADC 7.4.0 through 7.4.6, FortiADC 7.2.0 through 7.2.7, FortiADC 7.1.0 through 7.1.4, FortiADC 7.0 all versions, FortiADC 6.2 all versions, FortiADC 6.1 all versions, FortiADC 6.0 all versions, FortiADC 5.4 all versions, FortiADC 5.3 all versions, FortiADC 5.2 all versions, FortiADC 5.1 all versions, FortiADC 5.0 all versions, FortiADC 4.8 all versions, FortiADC 4.7 all versions, FortiADC 4.6 all versions, FortiADC 4.5 all versions, FortiADC 4.4 all versions, FortiADC 4.3 all versions, FortiADC 4.2 all versions, FortiADC 4.1 all versions, FortiADC 4.0 all versions, FortiADC 3.2 all versions, FortiADC 3.1 all versions, FortiADC 3.0 all versions may allow attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via <insert attack vector here> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation
skb metadata is meant for passing information between XDP and TC. It lives
in the skb headroom, immediately before skb->data. LWT programs cannot
access the __sk_buff->data_meta pseudo-pointer to metadata.
However, LWT encapsulation prepends outer headers, moving skb->data back
over the headroom where the metadata sits. On an RX-originated (forwarded)
packet that still carries XDP metadata this goes wrong in two different
ways, depending on the encap type:
1. Non-BPF LWT encaps (mpls, seg6, ioam6 ...) call skb_push()/skb_pull()
and silently overwrite the metadata that sits in the headroom.
2) BPF LWT xmit calls bpf_skb_change_head(), which uses skb_data_move().
That helper expects metadata immediately before skb->data. But since
the IP output path runs LWT xmit before neighbour output has built
the outgoing L2 header, for forwarded packets skb->data points at the
L3 header while skb_mac_header() still points at the old L2 header.
skb_data_move() sees metadata ending at skb_mac_header(), not before
skb->data, warns and clears metadata:
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 454557 at include/linux/skbuff.h:4609 skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 454557 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Tainted: G O 6.18.21 #1
RIP: 0010:skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
bpf_skb_change_head+0xe6/0x1a0
bpf_prog_...+0x213/0x2e3
run_lwt_bpf.isra.0+0x1d3/0x360
bpf_xmit+0x46/0xe0
lwtunnel_xmit+0xa1/0xf0
ip_finish_output2+0x1e7/0x5e0
ip_output+0x63/0x100
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0
process_backlog+0x9c/0x150
__napi_poll+0x2b/0x190
net_rx_action+0x40b/0x7f0
handle_softirqs+0xd2/0x270
do_softirq+0x3f/0x60
</IRQ>
That is what happens, as for how to fix it - a received packet that
carries metadata can reach an encap through any of the three LWT
redirect modes:
LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
lwtunnel_input
LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
lwtunnel_output
LWTUNNEL_STATE_XMIT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
ip6_output
ip6_finish_output
ip6_finish_output2
lwtunnel_xmit
Every encap funnels through the three LWT dispatch helpers, so drop the
metadata there, right before handing the skb to the encap op. This
single chokepoint covers all encap types and all three redirect modes:
- lwtunnel_input(): seg6, rpl, ila, seg6_local
- lwtunnel_output(): ioam6
- lwtunnel_xmit(): mpls, LWT BPF xmit
Alternatively, we could clear the metadata right after TC ingress hook.
That would require a compromise, however. Metadata would become
inaccessible from TC egress (in setups where it actually reaches the
hook it tact, that is without any L2 tunnels on path). |
