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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89653 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: reject export_targets ranks >= CEPH_MAX_MDS in mdsmap decode MDSMap export_targets entries are monitor controlled. check_new_map() uses each entry as a bit number in a fixed stack bitmap, so a rank outside the protocol namespace can make set_bit() write past the end of the array. Reject ranks outside CEPH_MAX_MDS while decoding the map. Do not validate against possible_max_rank here because maps may legitimately reference ranks beyond a temporarily reduced max_mds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89559 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in __nd_label_validate() The on-media namespace index field nslot is a u32 read from the DIMM label storage area. __nd_label_validate() bounds it against the config area size, but sizeof_namespace_label() returns unsigned, so the product nslot * label_size is evaluated in 32-bit and wraps modulo 2^32 before the comparison. A crafted nslot passes the bound and is then used as the loop trip count in nd_label_data_init(), whose memset() walks off the end of the config_size buffer: an out-of-bounds write. The field is not trusted -- it comes from the medium, or from userspace via ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA. Evaluate the product in 64-bit so the bound check is exact; conforming labels are unaffected. The check was safe when introduced by commit 4a826c83db4e ("libnvdimm: namespace indices: read and validate"): it multiplied by sizeof(struct nd_namespace_label), a size_t, so on a 64-bit build the product did not wrap. Commit 564e871aa66f ("libnvdimm, label: add v1.2 nvdimm label definitions") narrowed it to 32 bits when the label size became a runtime value read via sizeof_namespace_label(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89482 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: do not accept C2HData based on blk_rq_payload_bytes() alone Commit 25e5cb780e62 ("nvme-tcp: fix possible crash in write_zeroes processing") established that blk_rq_payload_bytes() must not be read without first checking blk_rq_nr_phys_segments(), and recorded the result in nvme_tcp_setup_cmd_pdu() as req->data_len. The receive side was left as it was. The two differ for REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES, which has no physical segments but a non-zero blk_rq_bytes(), so setup leaves req->iter untouched while the receive gate lets a C2HData through and nvme_tcp_recv_data() copies into whatever the previous command on that tag left there. The driver-private area is zeroed only when the tag set is allocated. Reproduced with a test target that leaves a residual iterator on a tag and then sends a C2HData for a WRITE_ZEROES command on the same tag: BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in _copy_to_iter+0x642/0x1330 Write of size 512 at addr ffe728c2175dfa81 by task kworker/0:1H/103 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 103 Comm: kworker/0:1H Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-NVMETCP-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: nvme_tcp_wq nvme_tcp_io_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 ? _copy_to_iter+0x642/0x1330 kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60 _copy_to_iter+0x642/0x1330 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 ? __pfx__copy_to_iter+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x83/0xe0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 __skb_datagram_iter+0xf3/0x820 ? __pfx_simple_copy_to_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60 ? skb_copy_bits+0x58d/0x830 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x37/0x120 nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0xa07/0x4320 ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810 ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_sock_nested+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___tcp_read_sock+0x10/0x10 nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x152/0x1e0 ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 nvme_tcp_io_work+0x1e4/0x6c0 ? __schedule+0x181a/0x49f0 ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_io_work+0x10/0x10 process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 Keep the blk_rq_payload_bytes() test and add req->data_len to it. The old test is what rejects a C2HData naming a tag that is no longer in flight, because blk_update_request() zeroes rq->__data_len on completion; req->data_len and req->curr_bio are driver-private and survive completion, so they cannot stand in for it. Setup initialises the iterator only when both req->curr_bio and req->data_len are set, so the gate now tests the same two. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81002 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xdp: fix zero-copy frame layout xdp_convert_zc_to_xdp_frame() clones an XSK packet into an order-0 page and advertises PAGE_SIZE as its frame size. It allows the copied frame to occupy the page tail needed by skb_shared_info and records zero headroom even when metadata separates the frame header from packet data. An AF_XDP zero-copy packet redirected through cpumap can therefore make the skb overlap skb_shared_info or place it beyond the allocated page. Limit the copied layout to SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE) and include the metadata length in frame headroom. Redirect callers already handle a NULL conversion result. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800cf37004 by task cpumap/1/map:1/146 Call Trace: skb_gro_receive (net/core/gro.c:174) udp_gro_receive (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:812) inet_gro_receive (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1539) dev_gro_receive (net/core/gro.c:515) gro_receive_skb (net/core/gro.c:633) cpu_map_kthread_run (kernel/bpf/cpumap.c:395) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255) Kernel panic - not syncing: KASAN: panic_on_warn set ... | ||||
| CVE-2026-81000 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tun: bound receive headroom tun_get_user() uses tun->align both as skb headroom and when choosing how much packet data to keep linear. OVS can propagate an oversized headroom request from another port to TUN or TAP. When align is larger than the usable space in a one-page skb head, SKB_MAX_HEAD(align) underflows and the result becomes negative when stored in good_linear. That value later wraps when assigned to the size_t linear variable, and tun_alloc_skb() can place skb->data outside the allocated head. Bound the headroom stored by TUN to the one-page skb-head budget and the largest non-sentinel 16-bit skb header offset. Leave one linear byte for raw TUN and a complete Ethernet header for TAP, including NET_IP_ALIGN. Also pull the raw-TUN protocol byte and the TAP Ethernet header before accessing them, so these checks remain safe for nonlinear skbs supplied by other allocation paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80944 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: Detach sync cmd buffer on interrupted wait mwifiex synchronous commands keep the caller-provided data buffer in cmd_node->data_buf. Several callers pass stack-allocated objects there. If wait_event_interruptible_timeout() is interrupted, the caller can return and release that stack object while the firmware command is still the current command. A late firmware response then reaches the normal response handler, which can copy data through cmd_node->data_buf into the stale stack address. This fixes a stack corruption observed during repeated association and disassociation cycles. The panic trace showed the command wait being interrupted immediately before a bad pointer dereference: cmd_wait_q terminated: -512 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 002c583837384662 Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted ... Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK The fault address decodes as little-endian ASCII: 0x002c583837384662 -> "bF878X,\0" which is a fragment of the VERSION_EXT firmware string exposed as debugfs "verext": w8997o-V4, RF878X, FP92, 16.92.21.p153.7 The same runs also showed corrupted control data containing: 0x2400372e333531 -> "153.7\0$" which is the tail of the same VERSION_EXT string. This points at a late VERSION_EXT response writing through a stale stack-backed data_buf after the interrupted wait returned. After cancelling pending commands on an interrupted or timed-out wait, detach the caller-owned data buffer from the still-current command. This preserves the existing command cancellation behaviour while preventing a late response from writing through a pointer whose lifetime ended with the waiting caller. Tested on an i.MX8MP board using an 88W8997. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80725 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB), BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP (with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header). However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp") loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues: 1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space before the MAC header (p->mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check with p->mac_header < 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb->head, causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb->mac_header. 2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q / ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because p->protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true. 3. It checked p->encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark, allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate beyond 64KB. Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce: - NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto == IPPROTO_TCP - Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark && !p->encapsulation) - Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6 - If ETH_P_IPV6, p->mac_header must be at least sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr) Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at <= 64KB and delivered intact without dropping. This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like 6.18.y. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80709 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Fix wrong domain value verification with EP11 CPRBs There is a wrong upper limit check for the domain value when an EP11 CPRB is processed for sending to a crypto card. This check is only active on custom device nodes but may lead to access heap memory behind perms->adm when an administrative CPRB is sent. Add correct limit (AP_DOMAINS = 256) checking to fix this. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80706 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: softing: fw_parse(): validate firmware record spans fw_parse() reads a fixed record header, a firmware-provided payload, and a trailing checksum without knowing the end of the firmware blob. A truncated record can therefore make those reads exceed the blob. The same record also supplies addresses and lengths for writes into DPRAM. The generic loader uses wrap-prone mixed signed arithmetic for its bounds check, while the application loader does not bound the staging copy at all. Pass the firmware end to the parser and validate the full source record. Use a signed wide offset for generic DPRAM records and validate the application staging span against the mapped DPRAM before copying. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80702 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: fix guest_memory_dirty bitfield clobbered as size Two sites in vmwgfx_resource.c assign boolean literals to res->guest_memory_size, which is an unsigned long allocation-size field; the intended target is the adjacent res->guest_memory_dirty bitfield. After the assignments the field holds 0 or 1 instead of the resource's MOB allocation size: - vmw_resource_release() writes 0 (false), and - vmw_resource_unbind_list() writes 1 (true). Subsequent revalidation paths read guest_memory_size when computing the dirty page range (vmw_bo_dirty_transfer_to_res()) and the buffer allocation size (vmw_resource_buf_alloc()), producing zero-length walks or wrap-around ranges that read or write past the MOB bitmap. The dirty-tracking intent of the original code (mark the resource as dirtied since the last sync) is also lost, since guest_memory_dirty is never updated. Rename both assignments to guest_memory_dirty. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80700 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps: - The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride * height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow. - The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride + width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride < width_in_bytes), and could likewise step past the end of either mapping. The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported framebuffer can reach this path. Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO's size up front using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride; otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride < width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent safely. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80615 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dst_metadata: fix false-positive memcpy overflow in tun_dst_unclone kmalloc_flex() in metadata_dst_alloc() sets __counted_by for the structure to the options_len, which is then initialized to zero. Later, we're initializing the structure by copying the tunnel info together with the options, and this triggers a warning for a potential memcpy overflow, since the compiler estimates that the options can't fit into the structure, even though the memory for them is actually allocated. memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 104 byte write of buffer size 96 WARNING: CPU: X PID: Y at lib/string_helpers.c:1036 __fortify_report skb_tunnel_info_unclone+0x179/0x190 geneve_xmit+0x7fe/0xe00 The issue is triggered when built with clang and source fortification. Fix that by doing the copy in two stages: first - the main data with the options_len, then the options. This way the correct length should be known at the time of the copy. It would be better if the options_len never changed after allocation, but the allocation code is a little separate from the initialization and it would be awkward and potentially dangerous to return a struct with options_len set to a non-zero value from the metadata_dst_alloc(). Another option would be to use ip_tunnel_info_opts_set(), but it is doing too many unnecessary operations for the use case here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80584 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/qeth: validate user buffer length in SNMP and ARP query ioctls qeth_snmp_command() and qeth_l3_arp_query() allocate a buffer sized by a user-supplied length (udata_len) without checking a lower bound, then set udata_offset to a fixed non-zero value and pass both to a reply callback. The callback bounds-checks the copy with if ((udata_len - udata_offset) < len) Both fields are u32, so a udata_len smaller than udata_offset makes the subtraction wrap and the check pass, and the following memcpy() writes past the allocation. A udata_len of 0 also yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR from kzalloc(), which the existing NULL check does not catch. Reject buffers smaller than udata_offset before allocating, so the callback subtraction can no longer underflow. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74640 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: fix OOB write in fcp_meter_ctl_get() fcp_ioctl_set_meter_map() bounds the user-supplied Level Meter map size by the driver's own limit of 255 if (map.map_size < 1 || map.map_size > 255 || map.meter_slots < 1 || map.meter_slots > 255) return -EINVAL; and passes it to fcp_add_new_ctl() as the control's channel count, where it is stored as elem->channels. Every control read writes into struct snd_ctl_elem_value, whose integer array is declared long value[128], so the limit is 128, not 255. fcp_meter_ctl_get() stores one 64-bit word per channel into that array with no bound of its own: for (i = 0; i < elem->channels; i++) { int idx = private->meter_level_map[i]; int value = idx < 0 ? 0 : le32_to_cpu(resp[idx]); ucontrol->value.integer.value[i] = value; } snd_ctl_elem_read_user() serves that object from memdup_user(_control, sizeof(*control)), 1224 bytes on LP64 out of kmalloc-2048. offsetof(struct snd_ctl_elem_value, value) is 72, so element i is written at byte 72 + 8 * i and element 144 already lands past the allocation. At map_size 255 the last store ends at byte 2112, 888 bytes past the object and 64 bytes into the adjacent slab object. The stored words come from the device and meter_level_map[] selects which word lands in which slot, so extent and contents are both controlled. The core does not catch this. snd_ctl_check_elem_info() is reached only from __snd_ctl_elem_info(), which snd_ctl_elem_read() calls under CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG; without that option snd_ctl_skip_validation() is a compile-time true. __snd_ctl_add_replace() validates kcontrol->count and never inspects elem->channels. Installing an oversized map needs CAP_SYS_RAWIO, but the control outlives the hwdep descriptor that created it, so the out-of-bounds stores are issued by any process able to read controls on /dev/snd/controlC0. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), triggered by an unprivileged control read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fcp_meter_ctl_get Write of size 8 at addr ffff000017af04c8 by task fcp_trigger/185 __asan_store8 fcp_meter_ctl_get snd_ctl_elem_read snd_ctl_ioctl Allocated by task 185: memdup_user snd_ctl_ioctl The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 1224-byte region [ffff000017af0000, ffff000017af04c8) Bound the map size by the ABI limit rather than by 255, and bound the store loop at the sink so it cannot run past the value array whatever elem->channels holds. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | ||||
| CVE-2026-74408 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath9k: fix OOB access from firmware tx status queue ID ath_tx_edma_tasklet() accesses sc->tx.txq[ts.qid] where ts.qid is a 4-bit hardware field (0-15), but the txq array only has ATH9K_NUM_TX_QUEUES (10) entries. A qid >= 10 causes an OOB array access. Add a bounds check on ts.qid before using it as an array index. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74404 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Fix snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions() off-by-one Sashiko notes: > regarding the bounds check in snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions() > called via walk_iomem_res_desc(): does the check > if ((range_list->num_elements * 16 + 8) > PAGE_SIZE) > allow an off-by-one heap buffer overflow? > > If range_list->num_elements is 255, 255 * 16 + 8 = 4088, which is <= 4096. > Writing range->base (8 bytes) fills 4088-4095, but writing range->page_count > (4 bytes) would write to 4096-4099, overflowing the kzalloc-allocated > PAGE_SIZE buffer. Fix this by accounting for the entry about to be written to, in addition to the entries that are already allocated. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74390 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Fix out-of-bounds write in irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs The irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs function loops through all of the umem DMA blocks to populate the PBLEs and will stop when either the last DMA block is reached or palloc->total_cnt is reached. The issue is that the logic for checking palloc->total_cnt would only work for non-zero values. When irdma_setup_pbles is called with lvl==0, it calls irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs with palloc->total_cnt==0, which means the only way to break out of the loop is to reach the last umem DMA block, which means it could end up going beyond the fixed size of 4 iwmr->pgaddrmem array that is used in the lvl==0 case. In the case of QP/CQ/SRQ rings, the value of lvl is determined by a separate input (for example, req.cq_pages in the case of a CQ). So, we must perform explicit checking to ensure we don't overflow the pgaddrmem array if the user provides a umem that consists of more blocks than their provided req.cq_pages. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74312 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost/vdpa: validate virtqueue index in mmap and fault paths vhost_vdpa_mmap() and vhost_vdpa_fault() use vma->vm_pgoff as a virtqueue index for get_vq_notification(), but they do not validate that the index is smaller than v->nvqs. The ioctl path already performs both a bounds check and array_index_nospec(), but the mmap/fault path only checks that the index fits in u16. This allows an out-of-range queue index to reach driver-specific get_vq_notification() callbacks. Fix this by extracting a unified vhost_vdpa_get_vq_notification() helper that validates the queue index against v->nvqs and applies array_index_nospec() before calling the driver callback. Both the mmap and fault paths use this helper, and the bounds checking is consolidated into a single location. From source inspection, the most defensible impact is out-of-bounds access in the callback path, potentially leading to invalid PFN remaps and crash/DoS. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72334 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: fix malformed ISO_END/CONT handling Core specification (Part C vol 4 sec 5.4.5) does not exclude empty ISO_CONT, ISO_END packets. We currently reject them if they are last. If controller sends malformed sequence ISO_START -> rx_len = 4, ISO_CONT skb->len 4, ISO_START that ends payload in ISO_CONT, we leak conn->rx_skb. If controller sends too long ISO_END, we panic on skb_put. If controller sends too short ISO_END we accept it. Fix by marking unfinished ISO_START via conn->rx_skb != NULL. Check skb->len properly before skb_put. Combine the ISO_CONT/END code paths as they require the same initial checks. Reject too short ISO_END packets. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72302 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Use overflow checks in control_update size calc In sof_ipc3_control_update(), the expected_size calculation uses firmware-provided cdata->num_elems in arithmetic that could overflow on 32-bit platforms, wrapping to a small value. This would allow the cdata->rhdr.hdr.size comparison to pass with mismatched sizes, potentially leading to out-of-bounds access in snd_sof_update_control. Use check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() to detect and reject overflowed size calculations. | ||||