| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: frags: strip GSO state from fragments before reassembly
A virtio_net_hdr (tun/tap, or AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR) can mark
an IPv4 or IPv6 fragment as GSO; nothing relates gso_type to frag_off.
inet_frag_reasm_prepare()/inet_frag_reasm_finish() keep the first
fragment's skb as the head of the reassembled datagram, including its
shinfo->gso_size/gso_type/gso_segs, and chain the remaining fragments
on frag_list with whatever linear/paged layout they arrived with.
After ip_defrag() (ip_local_deliver(), nf_defrag_ipv4, ...) the
reassembled skb therefore still claims to be GSO (SKB_GSO_DODGY), and
the next software segmentation point - udp_rcv_segment() on local
delivery, validate_xmit_skb(), or the ip_finish_output_gso() slow
path - hands it to skb_segment(). skb_segment()'s frag_list walk
assumes GRO-shaped input and hits one of its BUG_ON()s. Two writes to
a tap by an unprivileged user in its own userns are enough:
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4899!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 82 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.2.0-pentest+ #2
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x20ca/0x48b0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__udp_gso_segment+0x29a/0x27d0
udp4_ufo_fragment+0x458/0x6c0
inet_gso_segment+0x429/0x1340
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x233/0x4f0
__skb_gso_segment+0x308/0x660
udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x440/0xad0
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0xc7/0x2c0
udp_rcv+0x16ce/0x2260
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x197/0x2d0
ip_local_deliver+0x430/0x690
ip_rcv+0x16f/0x1f0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15e/0x1c0
__netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x110
netif_receive_skb+0xf6/0x5c0
tun_rx_batched.isra.0+0x3ab/0x790
tun_get_user+0x17c3/0x3550
tun_chr_write_iter+0xba/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x646/0x1130
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
This runs with BH disabled, so it is a panic rather than an oops. The
same is reachable with CAP_NET_RAW in a netns where a defrag point
precedes a GSO point, and from a guest whose VMM forwards
virtio_net_hdr to a tap. The SKB_GSO_DODGY frag_list checks added by
commit 3dcbdb134f32 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting
gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list") and by
commit 9e4b7a99a03a ("net: gso: fix panic on frag_list with mixed head
alloc types") do not cover it: page-backed heads skip them, and kmalloc
heads skip them when gso_size == skb_headlen(head), which the sender
controls.
An skb entering a frag queue is an IP fragment by definition and
cannot legitimately carry GSO state: GRO does not merge fragments and
the stack segments before it fragments, so only untrusted sources are
affected. This has been reachable since
commit f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr"), the first
path that let userspace attach GSO metadata to an IP fragment. Reset
the GSO fields of every fragment as it is queued, in
inet_frag_queue_insert(), which IPv4, IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm and
6lowpan reassembly share; then neither the head nor the frag_list
members of the reassembled skb carry them (the members matter too:
the ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() fast paths send them out as they
are). The head may remain CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; that is already accepted
on receive and resolved by skb_checksum_help() in
ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() on forward.
Tested on top of net.git (dc4b95b8fee9), x86_64: the tap reproducer
above, two further IPv4 frag_list geometries that reach
BUG_ON(i >= nfrags) and BUG_ON(!list_skb->head_frag), and an IPv6
fragment-header variant (udp6_ufo_fragment()) each panic the unpatched
kernel; with this patch all four datagrams are delivered intact and
nothing is logged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix RB-tree corruption in probe error path
The info->node RB-tree member is zero-initialized via kzalloc. If
a device does not support ATS, the device_rbtree_insert() call is
skipped. If a subsequent probe step fails, the error path jumps to
device_rbtree_remove(), which misinterprets the zeroed node as
a tree root and corrupts the device RB-tree.
Fix this by explicitly initializing the RB-node as empty using
RB_CLEAR_NODE() during initialization and guarding the removal with
RB_EMPTY_NODE(). |
| Unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Java SE 6u101, 7u85, and 8u60, and Java SE Embedded 8u51, allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors related to Serialization. |
| SQLite through 3.31.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a malformed window-function query because the AggInfo object's initialization is mishandled. |
| On the x86-64 architecture, the GNU C Library (aka glibc) before 2.31 fails to ignore the LD_PREFER_MAP_32BIT_EXEC environment variable during program execution after a security transition, allowing local attackers to restrict the possible mapping addresses for loaded libraries and thus bypass ASLR for a setuid program. |
| net/can/bcm.c in the Linux kernel through 5.12.10 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory because parts of a data structure are uninitialized. |
| Improper initialization in the firmware for some Intel(R) Processors may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| Insufficient initialization in Intel(R) SGX SDK Windows versions 2.4.100.51291 and earlier, and Linux versions 2.6.100.51363 and earlier, may allow an authenticated user to enable information disclosure, escalation of privilege or denial of service via local access. |
| Python's elementtree C accelerator failed to initialise Expat's hash salt during initialization. This could make it easy to conduct denial of service attacks against Expat by constructing an XML document that would cause pathological hash collisions in Expat's internal data structures, consuming large amounts CPU and RAM. The vulnerability exists in Python versions 3.7.0, 3.6.0 through 3.6.6, 3.5.0 through 3.5.6, 3.4.0 through 3.4.9, 2.7.0 through 2.7.15. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: clear stale xarray tags on folios skipped during writeback
In data=journal mode, the writeback thread can hit the
WARN_ON_ONCE(sb_rdonly(sb)) in ext4_journal_check_start() while the
superblock is being remounted read-only during reboot:
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)
RIP: 0010:ext4_journal_check_start+0x8b/0xd0
Call Trace:
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x3c/0x1e0
mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x4af/0x580
ext4_do_writepages+0x3c0/0x1080
ext4_writepages+0xc8/0x1a0
do_writepages+0xc4/0x180
__writeback_single_inode+0x45/0x2f0
writeback_sb_inodes+0x26b/0x5d0
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x54/0x100
wb_writeback+0x1ac/0x320
wb_workfn+0x394/0x470
And followed by the warning:
EXT4-fs warning (device vda1): ext4_evict_inode:195: inode #6263:
comm (sd-umount): data will be lost
This issue is not reproduced every time, but frequently.
The reproduction step is to create a VM with 8 CPUs, 16G memory and
setup data=journal:
sudo tune2fs -o journal_data /dev/vda1
Run fio:
rm -f fiotest
fio --name=fiotest --rw=randwrite --bs=4k --runtime=6 --ioengine=libaio
--iodepth=256 --numjobs=8 --filename=fiotest --filesize=30G
--group_reporting
Reboot the VM, and check the console output from:
virsh console testvm
But there is no dirty inode, folio_clear_dirty_for_io clears PG_dirty
but leaves tags PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY and PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE set which
are only cleared by __folio_start_writeback.
In data=journal mode, jbd2 checkpoints the journalled data to its final
location and clears its own dirty flag without touching folio PG_dirty
or xarray dirty flags.
The commit f4a2b42e7891 ("ext4: fix stale xarray tags after writeback")
fixes when PG_dirty is still set but there is no dirty page.
Another case is PG_dirty is cleared, but PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY and
PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE is still set. In this case, writeback thread
checks clean folio and skips it in mpage_prepare_extent_to_map:
if (!folio_test_dirty(folio) ||
...
folio_unlcok(folio);
continue
And never reaches ext4_bio_write_folio where the commit f4a2b42e7891
clears the stale xarray tags. Print debug logs after the filesystem
is remounted read-only:
writepages RDONLY nrpages=2048 dirtytag=1 wbtag=0 towrite=1 sync=0
And all folios are actually clean:
folio idx=3 dirty=0 wb=0 checked=0 dirtybuf=0 jbddirty=0 mapped=1
...
We need to clear the xarray stale tags for such clean folios by
cycling them through writeback in the skip path, the same way
f4a2b42e7891 does in ext4_bio_write_folio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Do not save/restore percpu base register in rethook trampoline
The rethook trampoline saves $r21 ($u0), the percpu base, into its frame
at entry and restores it at exit. Inbetween rethook_trampoline_handler()
may schedule via preempt_enable_notrace().
If the task migrates to another CPU, the frame's $r21 holds the old
CPU's percpu base, and restoring it poisons $r21 on the new CPU. Until
the next user->kernel transition heals $r21, all this_cpu_*() accesses
(runqueues, RCU per-CPU data, timer tick programming, FPU ownership)
hit the wrong CPU's percpu area.
Under kretprobe-heavy preemptible load this can corrupt scheduler and
timer state: scheduling-while-atomic splats, wrong-CPU RCU warnings,
WARN_ON_ONCE(rq != this_rq()) in nohz_balance_exit_idle(), and CPUs
parking in the idle loop with the constant timer never re-armed (hard
lockup). Reproduces on a Loongson-3A6000 with kretprobes on VFS paths
plus heavy file churn (OS install / unsquashfs).
By convention $r21 always holds the current CPU's percpu base in kernel
mode: SAVE_SOME() at exception entry reloads it only when coming from
user mode, and RESTORE_SOME() restores it only when returning to user
mode; the context-switch path never writes it. Therefore the live $r21
at trampoline exit is already correct, and nothing inbetween can change
it legitimately (kernel C code cannot write a global register variable).
The same flaw existed even in the pre-rethook kretprobe trampoline since
v6.3; it was carried over when rethook replaced it. Drop both the save
and the restore here. Drop the restore is enough to solve the issue, and
drop the save is to keep the code tidy and no need to clear it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: stop retrying saturated xattr cache entries
ext4_xattr_block_set() retries when a cache entry selected for reuse
has a saturated reference count after taking the buffer lock. The retry
returns to the mbcache lookup without making that entry ineligible, so
it can select the same unusable entry indefinitely. A task spinning
there can hold the parent directory's i_rwsem and leave concurrent
rmdir callers blocked.
Normally a reusable entry has a reference count below
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX because the count and MBE_REUSABLE_B are
updated under the same buffer lock. A corrupted filesystem can violate
that invariant. The syzbot reproducer reports allocator and xattr
corruption before triggering this retry loop.
Check the untrusted on-disk count before incrementing it, avoiding
overflow, and clear MBE_REUSABLE_B when it is already saturated. The
next lookup then skips the entry that was just proven unusable. This
mirrors the normal transition at EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX; the release
path marks the entry reusable again on the exact 1024-to-1023
transition.
Using the same QEMU harness and guest parameters, current unpatched
Linux hung in 6 of 8 420-second trials with the do_rmdir signature;
representative NMI backtraces caught the owner spinning in
ext4_xattr_block_set(). The patched kernel completed 28 of 28 trials
without a hung-task report; the final twelve trials exercised the
reviewed overflow-safe form of the change. syzbot's patch testing also
completed without reproducing the hang. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix buffer head management in ocfs2_read_blocks()
In ocfs2_read_blocks(), caller should't assume that buffer head returned
by 'sb_getblk()' is exclusively owned and so 'put_bh()' always drops
b_count from 1 to 0. If it is not so, buffer head remains on hold and
likely to be returned by the next call to 'sb_getblk()' unchanged - that
is, with BH_Uptodate bit set even if it has failed validation previously,
thus allowing to insert that buffer head into OCFS2 metadata cache and
submit it to upper layers. To avoid such a scenario, BH_Uptodate should
be cleared immediately after 'validate()' callback has detected some data
inconsistency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: Allocate iomap inline_data using alloc_page
This fixes a BUG reported in iomap_write_end_inline:
iomap_inline_data_valid checks that the inline_data fits within
a page. If the inline_data is allocated with kmemdup there's no
guarantee that it's page-aligned, so the check sometimes fails.
Allocate it with alloc_page to ensure it's page-aligned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/perf: fix preempt count underflow in fsl_emb_pmu_del
fsl_emb_pmu_del() unconditionally calls put_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events) at
the 'out:' label, but only calls the matching get_cpu_var() after the
'i < 0' early-return check. When event->hw.idx is negative the
function jumps to 'out:' without having taken get_cpu_var(), and the
trailing put_cpu_var() then issues an unmatched preempt_enable(),
underflowing preempt_count.
On a CONFIG_PREEMPT=y kernel preempt_count would underflow and
eventually present as a 'scheduling while atomic' BUG.
Move put_cpu_var() to pair with get_cpu_var() so the percpu access is
correctly bracketed and the 'out:' label only handles perf_pmu_enable. |
| OneCRL was non-functional in the new Firefox for Android due to a missing service initialization. This could result in a failure to enforce some certificate revocations. *Note: This issue only affected Firefox for Android. Other operating systems are unaffected.*. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 83. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: use dst in this direction when pushing IPIP header
When pushing the IPIP header, the route of the other direction is used
to calculate the headroom, use the route in this direction. Accessing
the other tuple to set the IP source and destination is fine because
this tuple does not provide such information to avoid storing redundant
information. However, this tuple already provides the dst for this
direction, this went unnoticed because this bug affects headroom and
iph->frag_off only at this stage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix the reception of a reply packet before data transmission
Fix rxrpc_receiving_reply() to handle the reception of an apparent reply
DATA packet before rxrpc has had a chance to send any request DATA packets
on a client call by checking to see if the call has been exposed yet by
sending the first packet.
Without this, rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() might oops.
Also fix rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() to handle the Tx queue being empty by
changing the do...while loop into a while loop, just in case a call is
abnormally terminated by an early reply before the last request packet is
transmitted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: ca8210: fix pointer truncation in kfifo on 64-bit
ca8210_test_int_driver_write() and ca8210_test_int_user_read() exchange
a kmalloc'd buffer pointer through a struct kfifo, but pass a literal
'4' as the byte count to kfifo_in()/kfifo_out().
This is correct on 32-bit (pointer = 4 bytes), but on 64-bit only the
low 4 bytes of the 8-byte pointer are written into the FIFO. The reader
then reads back 4 bytes into an 8-byte local pointer variable, leaving
the upper 4 bytes uninitialized stack data. The first dereference of
the reconstructed pointer (fifo_buffer[1]) accesses an arbitrary kernel
address and generally results in an oops.
Use sizeof(fifo_buffer) so the byte count matches pointer width on every
architecture.
The driver has no architecture restriction in Kconfig, so any 64-bit
build with CONFIG_IEEE802154_CA8210_DEBUGFS=y is exposed. Issue has
been latent since the driver was added in 2017 because it is most
commonly deployed on 32-bit MCUs.
Found via a custom Coccinelle semantic patch hunting for short-byte
kfifo I/O on byte-mode kfifos used to shuttle pointers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: Fit paired fragment job in the correct CCCB
For geometry jobs with a paired fragment job, at the moment, the
DRM scheduler's prepare_job() callback:
- checks for internal (driver) dependencies for the geometry job;
- calls into pvr_queue_get_paired_frag_job_dep() to check for external
dependencies for the fragment job (the two jobs are submitted together
but the common scheduler code doesn't know about it, so this needs to
be done at this point in time);
- calls into the prepare_job() callback again, but for the fragment job,
to check its internal dependencies as well, passing the fragment job's
drm_sched_job and the geometry job's drm_sched_entity / pvr_queue.
The problem with the last step is that pvr_queue_prepare_job() doesn't
always take the mismatched fragment job and geometry queue into account,
in particular when checking whether there is space for the fragment
command to be submitted, so the code ends up checking for space in the
geometry (i.e. wrong) CCCB.
The rest of the nested prepare_job() callback happens to work fine at
the moment as the other internal dependencies are not relevant for a
paired fragment job.
Move the initialisation of a paired fragment job's done fence and CCCB
fence to pvr_queue_get_paired_frag_job_dep(), inferring the correct
queue from the fragment job itself.
This fixes cases where prepare_job() wrongly assumed that there was
enough space for a paired fragment job in its own CCCB, unblocking
run_job(), which then returned early without writing the full sequence
of commands to the CCCB.
The above lead to kernel warnings such as the following and potentially
job timeouts (depending on waiters on the missing commands):
[ 552.421075] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_cccb.c:178 at pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr], CPU#2: kworker/u16:5/63
[ 552.421230] Modules linked in:
[ 552.421592] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 63 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc2-gc5d053e4dccb #39 PREEMPT
[ 552.421625] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 552.421637] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM625 SK (DT)
[ 552.421655] Workqueue: powervr-sched drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[ 552.421744] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 552.421766] pc : pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr]
[ 552.421850] lr : pvr_queue_submit_job_to_cccb+0x57c/0xa74 [powervr]
[ 552.421923] sp : ffff800084c47650
[ 552.421936] x29: ffff800084c47740 x28: 0000000000000df8 x27: ffff800088a77000
[ 552.421979] x26: 0000000000000030 x25: ffff800084c47680 x24: 0000000000001000
[ 552.422017] x23: ffff800084c47820 x22: 1ffff00010988ecc x21: 0000000000000008
[ 552.422055] x20: 0000000000000208 x19: ffff000006ad5a88 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 552.422093] x17: 0000000020020000 x16: 0000000000020000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 552.422130] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 552.422167] x11: 000000000000f2f2 x10: 00000000f3000000 x9 : 00000000f3f3f3f3
[ 552.422204] x8 : 00000000f2f2f200 x7 : ffff700010988ecc x6 : 0000000000000008
[ 552.422241] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 1ffff0001114ee00 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 552.422278] x2 : 0000000000000007 x1 : 0000000000000fff x0 : 000000000000002f
[ 552.422316] Call trace:
[ 552.422330] pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr] (P)
[ 552.422411] pvr_queue_submit_job_to_cccb+0x57c/0xa74 [powervr]
[ 552.422486] pvr_queue_run_job+0x3a4/0x990 [powervr]
[ 552.422562] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x580/0xd48 [gpu_sched]
[ 552.422623] process_one_work+0x520/0x1288
[ 552.422657] worker_thread+0x3f0/0xb3c
[ 552.422679] kthread+0x334/0x3d8
[ 552.422706] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
