| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| ModSecurity is an open source, cross platform web application firewall (WAF) engine for Apache, IIS and Nginx. Prior to 2.9.15 and 3.0.17, msre_fn_removeComments_execute in apache2/re_tfns.c and inplace() in src/actions/transformations/remove_comments.cc implement t:removeComments by copying the character immediately after a comment terminator without re-evaluating it. Adjacent comments can therefore leave a later comment in the transformed value, allowing inline-comment obfuscation to bypass rules that depend on comment stripping. When a comment terminator is the final content, the same copy reads one byte beyond the input buffer. This issue is fixed in versions 2.9.15 and 3.0.17. |
| Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.15.0, the conditions filter webhook in libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts passes the user-configured child.webhookUrl directly to axios.post without calling validateUrlSsrf. Evaluating a workflow condition can therefore make the worker send a POST request to a private or link-local service and return the response data for condition evaluation. The response is stored in execution details and exposed through GET /execution-details, which can disclose credentials from POST-capable metadata services or data from internal services, although metadata endpoints that require GET are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0. |
| The XRootD project provides a high-performance, fault-tolerant, and secure solution for handling large amounts of data distributed across multiple storage resources. Prior to version 5.9.2, XRootD's rpCheck() function in src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc rejects a parent-directory component only when two dots are followed by a slash and does not reject a terminal two-dot component. An unauthenticated attacker can append /.. to an exported path in xrdfs ls or an HTTP PROPFIND request, bypass the all.export directory scope, and cause directory and filename enumeration in the parent directory under oss.localroot. The demonstrated vector does not permit file download or disclose file contents. This issue is fixed in version 5.9.2. |
| djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to versions 1.0.10 and 1.1.2, djust keys context output-safety grants by variable name and fails to revoke a grant when a template bind replaces the value associated with that name. A template using {% with %}, {% for %}, {% include ... with %}, tuple unpacking, or assign tags can therefore rebind a name that previously held mark_safe content and emit the new attacker-controlled value without escaping, including descendant lookups through the rebound name. This can cause stored or reflected cross-site scripting when a victim renders the affected template. This issue is fixed in versions 1.0.10 and 1.1.2. |
| The NXP ENET-QOS Ethernet driver's receive work handler eth_nxp_enet_qos_rx() in drivers/ethernet/eth_nxp_enet_qos hands each processed descriptor back to the DMA by writing desc->read.control = rx_desc_refresh_flags, which sets OWN_FLAG and BUF1_ADDR_VALID_FLAG. RDES0 of a receive descriptor is the DMA buffer address in read format, but the hardware write-back aliases that word with the VLAN tag fields (or, for a context descriptor, the timestamp low word), so it is destroyed on every completion. The success path rewrites desc->read.buf1_addr before re-arming; the four drop paths — errored or non-first descriptor, net_pkt_rx_alloc() failure, invalid descriptor length, and net_pkt_get_frag() failure — did not, re-arming the ring slot with the write-back residue as its DMA target address.
The drop paths are driven entirely by received traffic and need no privilege or special configuration. With the defaults for this driver (CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE of 128 and 16 receive descriptors) a single full-size frame consumes twelve ring slots and twelve K_NO_WAIT fragment allocations, so a short burst of frames sent to the device exhausts the receive pools and reaches the allocation-failure paths; a frame with a receive error, or any frame whose first descriptor was already dropped, reaches the non-first-descriptor path.
Once a slot has been poisoned, the DMA writes the next frame received in that slot to an address derived from the frame's VLAN tag fields rather than to a receive buffer. On the supported MCX SoCs that address falls in flash or reserved space, so the transfer raises a fatal bus error that the driver only logs — there is no reset or recovery path — and reception stops permanently until the device is rebooted; where the write is silently discarded instead, the untouched buffer is later handed to the network stack with a length, delivering stale buffer contents as if they were a received frame. A single triggering event is enough to make the condition persistent, so an attacker able to send traffic to the device can permanently disable its network interface. |
| The NXP ENET QoS Ethernet driver in drivers/ethernet/eth_nxp_enet_qos serialises transmission with a binary semaphore, data->tx.tx_sem, taken in eth_nxp_enet_qos_tx() and returned only by the transmit-completion interrupt handler tx_dma_done(). A frame that has been handed to the transmit DMA when the Ethernet link goes down is never written back, so that completion interrupt never arrives. The PHY callback eth_nxp_enet_qos_phy_cb() reacts to carrier loss only by calling net_eth_carrier_set(); it does not stop the DMA, take the descriptors back or release the outstanding frame, and no timeout exists to do so.
The trigger is a link-down/link-up transition that lands while a frame is under the transmit DMA. It can be produced by anyone who controls the link partner or the cable — for example by administratively downing and restoring the attached switch port, or by restarting auto-negotiation from a peer device — and can be made reliable by generating traffic that keeps the device transmitting and repeating the transition. No credentials or user interaction are required, and the trigger is at the link layer rather than over IP.
Because the semaphore is never given back, every subsequent call to eth_nxp_enet_qos_tx() fails with -EBUSY for the remaining life of the boot; restoring the link does not recover the interface, since the link-up path only rewrites MAC_CONFIGURATION. The affected interface continues to receive but can no longer transmit anything — no ARP replies, no TCP acknowledgements, no DHCP renewals — until the device is reset. The net_pkt and the net_buf fragments of the abandoned frame are likewise never unreferenced and never return to their pools. The security-relevant property is persistence: a momentary link flap leaves the interface permanently unable to send, so the denial of service outlasts the attacker's access to the link. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact.
The fix adds a claim/release pair around the outstanding packet so that completion and abandonment are mutually exclusive, aborts an outstanding frame from the PHY callback on carrier loss (stopping the DMA, flushing the MTL transmit queue and reinitialising the descriptor ring), and arms a transmit watchdog, CONFIG_ETH_NXP_ENET_QOS_TX_TIMEOUT_MS, so that any non-completing DMA — not only a carrier loss — reclaims the transmit slot and the packet. |
| When CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED is enabled, each thread stack is mapped into the kernel virtual address space with a guard page on either side, and the mapping is released during abort cleanup. k_thread_abort_cleanup() in kernel/thread.c has two paths: a deferred one for self-abort, which stashes the mapping in thread_cleanup_stack_addr/thread_cleanup_stack_sz, and an immediate one for a thread aborted by some other thread. The immediate path called do_thread_cleanup(), which ignored its thread argument and only ever unmapped the stashed address — a value populated exclusively by the self-abort path. The mapped stack of a thread aborted by another thread was therefore never unmapped.
Every k_thread_abort() of a non-current thread leaks the thread's stack region plus its two guard pages from the kernel virtual address space. Threads that end by returning from their entry function take the working self-abort path, so the leak is specific to explicit cancellation — k_thread_abort(), pthread_cancel(), osThreadTerminate(), or the kernel thread kill shell command. Both k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE an unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted a thread object and a user-capable stack object can drive the leak from user mode, consuming a kernel-side resource it cannot otherwise touch.
With CONFIG_KERNEL_VM_SIZE defaulting to 8 MB, a few hundred create/abort cycles exhaust the runtime mapping region. k_mem_map_phys_guard() then returns NULL, and map_thread_stack() guards that only with __ASSERT_NO_MSG(), which is compiled out of production builds; thread creation proceeds to write through a NULL-derived stack base and faults in kernel mode. The impact is a persistent denial of service — a kernel fatal error requiring a reboot — with no memory disclosure or corruption, and it is limited to configurations where memory-mapped thread stacks are enabled (x86 targets with X86_MMU and demand paging disabled, where the option is implied by default). |
| The HTTP client's debug helper print_header_field() in subsys/net/lib/http/http_client.c formatted an http_parser data-callback slice with a %s conversion: snprintk(output, len + 1, "%s", str). The parser hands its callbacks a pointer and a length into the caller's receive buffer, and those bytes are not NUL terminated. The size argument of snprintk() bounds only the destination, while the %s conversion measures the source first — lib/os/cbprintf_complete.c uses strlen() when no precision is given, and lib/os/cbprintf_nano.c uses strlen() unconditionally — so the read walks past the end of the header field and past the end of the receive buffer until it finds a zero byte.
The slice reaches the helper from on_url(), on_header_field() and on_header_value(), which the parser invokes on bytes that http_wait_data() read straight off the socket into the application-supplied recv_buf. A malicious or compromised HTTP server, or an attacker able to answer a plaintext request, therefore controls both the header field and the bytes that follow it in the buffer, and can guarantee that no zero byte appears before the buffer ends, forcing the over-read. The in-tree tests/net/lib/http_client suite reproduces the over-read under CONFIG_ASAN=y on an ordinary GET.
The impact is bounded. The whole helper body is compiled only when the HTTP client log module is explicitly set to Debug (CONFIG_NET_HTTP_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, which the global CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL does not set), so default builds are unaffected. No out-of-bounds write occurs and none of the over-read bytes are emitted into the log, so there is no information disclosure; the consequence is an out-of-bounds read that can fault and panic the device where the buffer abuts an unmapped or MPU/MMU-protected region.
The fix copies exactly the len bytes the parser offered with memcpy() and terminates them, instead of relying on a %s conversion (a %.*s precision would not have sufficed, since cbprintf_nano.c measures the source in full before applying it). |
| usbh_device_init() in subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c rejects a device whose device descriptor advertises bNumConfigurations == 0, but it only logs the error and jumps to the cleanup label without setting the return code. At that point the local err is still 0 from the preceding successful descriptor read, so the function returns success while having skipped usbh_device_set_configuration() — the only place udev->cfg_desc is allocated. The device structure is zero-initialised by usbh_device_alloc(), so udev->cfg_desc remains NULL.
usbh_device_connect() treats the zero return as a successful enumeration and calls usbh_class_probe_device(), which starts its descriptor walk from udev->cfg_desc. usbh_desc_get_next_function() passes that NULL pointer to usbh_desc_is_valid(), whose only guard compares the caller-supplied size, so head->bLength is read through a NULL pointer.
The condition is triggered entirely by the attached peripheral: attaching a USB device (or any USB gadget emulating one) that reports bNumConfigurations = 0 reaches the defect directly from the UHC_EVT_DEV_CONNECTED_FS/_HS event handler in subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c, with no authentication and no user interaction beyond the physical attachment.
On targets where page zero is unmapped or CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION is enabled this raises a fatal exception in the USB host thread, denying service to the host. Where address zero is readable, the descriptor walker instead parses low memory as a descriptor chain and can dispatch a class probe() with attacker-influenced values, causing further out-of-bounds reads through the still-NULL udev->cfg_desc in usbh_desc_get_iface(). No attacker-controlled write was identified, so the impact is availability plus a bounded out-of-bounds read. Note that CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK is marked experimental. |
| The Xtensa MMU userspace port never initialized the per-thread page-table pointer thread->arch.ptables during thread setup, while arch_mem_domain_thread_add() in arch/xtensa/core/ptables.c uses a non-NULL value of that field as its "this thread is migrating from another memory domain" predicate. For a thread whose struct k_thread backing memory is not zeroed, the field holds stale data and the kernel takes the migration branch, passing that stale value to reset_region() as the base of a level-1 page table. The equivalent field on x86 is explicitly cleared in z_x86_userspace_prepare_thread() for exactly this reason; the Xtensa port adopted the predicate without the initialization.
The condition is reachable from an unprivileged user-mode thread on a build with CONFIG_XTENSA_MMU, CONFIG_USERSPACE and dynamically allocated kernel objects. k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) is a system call and allocates the thread object from the caller's resource pool without zeroing it, and the k_thread_create() verifier accepts such an object while forcing the K_USER option, so the migration branch is taken whenever the recycled heap bytes at that offset are non-zero. Because a user thread can also allocate, fill and free other kernel objects from the same heap, the stale bytes are groomable rather than merely random.
Walking the bogus table in region_map_update() performs an unguarded index into l2_page_tables_counter[], may copy from and write through the attacker-influenceable level-1 base in dup_l2_table_if_needed(), and finally writes a page-table entry through a second pointer read out of that memory — once per page of the new thread's stack. The result is out-of-bounds reads and writes executed in supervisor mode, ranging from an immediate kernel panic (observed as Xtensa EXCAUSE 13 on Intel ADSP DSP firmware with user threads) to corruption of kernel memory and escape from the user-mode sandbox. |
| The Renesas RA SCI UART driver's receive-error ISR, uart_ra_sci_eri_isr() in drivers/serial/uart_renesas_ra_sci.c, acknowledged the error condition only when a Zephyr interrupt-driven callback had already been registered. With CONFIG_UART_INTERRUPT_DRIVEN=y and CONFIG_UART_ASYNC_API=n, if data->user_cb is NULL the ISR body is empty: the SCI error flags (SSR.ORER, SSR.FER, SSR.PER) are left set and the ICU event flag R_ICU->IELSR_b[eri_irq].IR is never cleared, so the interrupt re-pends immediately and the ISR is re-entered without end.
The error interrupt is masked at boot by uart_ra_sci_init(), but FSP's R_SCI_UART_Open() unconditionally re-enables it, and uart_ra_sci_configure() - the back end of the public uart_configure() API, enabled by default via CONFIG_UART_USE_RUNTIME_CONFIGURE - performs a Close()/Open() pair without re-masking it. Any runtime uart_configure() therefore leaves the error interrupt live regardless of whether a callback has been set, as does calling uart_irq_err_enable() on its own. An instance used with the polling API, or the window between uart_configure() and uart_irq_callback_user_data_set(), thus runs with the error interrupt unmasked and no callback registered.
The trigger is an ordinary receive line error - overrun, framing, parity, or a break condition - which is fully determined by the device attached to the serial link. A peer able to assert a break or transmit at a mismatched baud rate produces such an error at will, so a single frame is enough to enter the state.
The impact is availability only: the CPU is captured in the re-entering ISR and never returns to thread context, hanging the entire system until an external reset or hardware watchdog fires. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure. Builds using the asynchronous UART API are unaffected, because the fall-through to FSP's sci_uart_eri_isr() clears both the error flags and the pending IRQ. |
| Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8, Rack::Multipart::Parser can retain parsed data in its internal StringScanner buffer when reads end inside or immediately after multipart headers. An unauthenticated attacker can align many small parts with rack.multipart.buffer_size boundaries so the buffer grows with the request despite per-field, header, and preamble limits, causing a worker to exhaust memory. The attack requires only a well-formed multipart body and affects applications that parse multipart requests. This issue is fixed in versions 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8. |
| TinyUSB through 0.21.0, fixed in commit e85c2b8, contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the MTP device class helper mtp_container_get_string() in src/class/mtp/mtp.h that allows a malicious USB host to corrupt adjacent memory by supplying a crafted MTP string with an unbounded character count. Attackers can exploit the unchecked memcpy operation copying up to 510 bytes into a fixed-size destination buffer to achieve code execution or cause a denial of service on the TinyUSB MTP device. |
| Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8, Rack::Static serves a path after Utils.clean_path_info normalization but evaluates header_rules against a path that is only URL-decoded. An unauthenticated attacker can request a known file through raw or percent-encoded dot segments and receive it without path-specific security headers such as Content-Disposition or Content-Security-Policy. Applications that do not use path-specific header_rules are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in braindecode up to 1.8.2. This affects the function EEGModuleMixin._from_pretrained of the file braindecode/models/base.py of the component Hub Integration. Such manipulation of the argument filename leads to path traversal. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. Upgrading to version 2.0.0 mitigates this issue. The name of the patch is 05b764d93b9a50400f523206fbe03d73d0cf5edb. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. |
| SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the corresponding entries fit the declared chunk length. A negotiated WebRTC peer can send a checksum-valid malformed SACK chunk that drives the parser beyond the 262144-byte receive buffer. The resulting IndexOutOfRangeException bypasses the recoverable ApplicationException handler in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, causing the generic handler to exit the dedicated receive loop and permanently terminate the SCTP association and all data channels. This issue is fixed in 10.0.14. |
| In apport before 2.37.0, an improper privilege management vulnerability allows an unprivileged local attacker to gain root privileges on systems where automatic crash reporting is enabled. The automatic crash report processing pipeline runs as root and executes ldd on the attacker-controlled ExecutablePath field of a crash file placed in the world-writable /var/crash directory, causing the dynamic loader to load and execute an attacker-supplied audit module specified by the ELF's DT_AUDIT tag. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges and fully compromise the affected system. |
| An authorization issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7.3 and iPadOS 26.7.3, iOS 27.2.1 and iPadOS 27.2.1, macOS Golden Gate 27.2.1, macOS Sequoia 15.8.3, macOS Tahoe 26.7.3, visionOS 27.2.1, watchOS 27.2.1. A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and receive its messages. |
| A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.12 and iPadOS 18.7.12, iOS 26.7.3 and iPadOS 26.7.3, iOS 27.2.1 and iPadOS 27.2.1, macOS Golden Gate 27.2.1, macOS Sequoia 15.8.3, macOS Tahoe 26.7.3, visionOS 27.2.1, watchOS 26.6.1, watchOS 27.2.1. An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user interaction. |
| This issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.12 and iPadOS 18.7.12, iOS 26.7.3 and iPadOS 26.7.3, iOS 27.2.1 and iPadOS 27.2.1, macOS Golden Gate 27.2.1, macOS Sequoia 15.8.3, macOS Tahoe 26.7.3, visionOS 27.2.1, watchOS 26.6.1, watchOS 27.2.1. A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing without user interaction. |
