| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix XDR padding calculation in ff_encode_getdeviceinfo
nfsd4_ff_encode_getdeviceinfo() computes the da_addr_body reservation
as 16 + netid_len + addr_len, but the subsequent xdr_encode_opaque()
calls emit 8 + round_up(netid_len, 4) + round_up(addr_len, 4) bytes.
The mismatch means the declared da_addr_body length exceeds the actual
encoded data by 2-8 bytes on every flexfile GETDEVICEINFO reply,
leaking stale reply-page content to the client and mis-aligning the
subsequent version list decode.
Use xdr_align_size() for each string length to match what
xdr_encode_opaque() actually writes. |
| libdvdnav before 7.0.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in dvdnav_describe_title_chapters that allows attackers to read beyond the part-of-title array by supplying an oversized vts_ttn value. Attackers can provide a crafted DVD or disc image declaring a larger VMGI title vts_ttn than the title set's entries to crash applications enumerating chapters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: clamp v9 CRIU control stack checkpoint copy to BO size
CRIU checkpoint copies the MQD control stack using cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size
from hardware without bounding it to the allocated BO region. If the HW
field is larger than the queue's control stack allocation, memcpy reads
past the BO into adjacent GTT memory and can leak kernel data to userspace.
Store the page-aligned control stack BO size in mqd_manager and clamp
checkpoint copies and reported checkpoint sizes to
min(cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size, mm->ctl_stack_size). Apply the same bound
for multi-XCC v9.4.3 checkpoint layout.
(cherry picked from commit 6c2abd0ec09e86c6323010673766f76050e28aa3) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix buffer over-read in rtw_update_protection
rtw_update_protection() is called with a pointer offset into the
ies buffer but the full ie_length is passed, causing a potential
buffer over-read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: restore rq_status_counter to even on all nfsd_dispatch() exit paths
nfsd_dispatch() sets rq_status_counter to an odd value once a request has
been decoded, and back to an even value once it has been fully processed,
forming a seq-lock like protocol with the lockless reader in
nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit().
Only the fully successful path restored the counter to even. The cache-hit
(RC_REPLY), drop (RC_DROPIT / RQ_DROPME) and encode-error paths all return
after the odd-valued store without ever bringing the counter back to even.
Once one of those paths is taken, rq_status_counter is left odd: the next
request's decode ORs in 1 (still odd) and only a subsequent successful
encode restores even. While stuck odd, the dumpit reader treats the rqstp
fields as stable and its retry check compares against the same unchanging
odd value, so it never detects concurrent mutation. This exposes actively
mutating fields (e.g. args->ops / args->opcnt during compound decode and
release) to the lockless reader, which can read past the end of the
8-element inline ops array.
Add a helper that advances the counter to the next even value and call it
on every return path that follows the odd-valued store. The decode-error
path is left untouched as it is reached before the counter is set odd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size
The CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58
bytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing
64 bytes at offset 0x18. CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512,
eight times the actual on-device size.
header_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the
RAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes.
The cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE
(512) bytes from its source. For the CPER caller the source is
struct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a
stack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes
of kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can
read it via tracefs.
Set CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it,
bringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords. Userspace tools
such as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32)
header_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event. Add
CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event
__array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI. Both callers now pass a
zero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only
the first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware;
the remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring
buffer layout intact.
[ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ] |
| A malformed header in the binary file fed to QBinaryJson::fromBinaryData() can cause undefined behaviour because of out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()
decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations
that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds
reads:
1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds
check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the
internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an
OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with
p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads
4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is
passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.
The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses
ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call.
decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.
2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding
bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop
advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads
one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed
directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by
callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct
influence over the lock type field.
Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers,
err_inval)
ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type,
err_free_lockers)
The goto targets differ intentionally:
err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for
the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated
and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().
err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the
post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must
be freed.
ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that
err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation.
Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from
the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.
-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the
OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure
class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).
[ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Validate the packet length reported by the NIC
Validate the packet length reported in the RX CQE before passing it
to skb processing. The CQE is supplied by the NIC device and should
not be blindly trusted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: use parsed transport offset in SCTP state lookup
set_sctp_state() reads the SCTP chunk header again in order to drive the
IPVS SCTP state table. For IPv6 it computes the offset with
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code uses iph.len from
ip_vs_fill_iph_skb(), where ipv6_find_hdr() has already skipped
extension headers and found the real transport header.
This makes the state machine read from the wrong offset for IPv6 SCTP
packets that carry extension headers. For example, an INIT packet with an
8-byte destination options header can be scheduled correctly by
sctp_conn_schedule(), but set_sctp_state() reads the first byte of the
SCTP verification tag as a DATA chunk type. The connection then moves
from NONE to ESTABLISHED instead of INIT1, gets the longer established
timeout, and updates the active/inactive destination counters
incorrectly. This happens even though the SCTP handshake has not
completed.
Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() for
the SCTP chunk-header lookup. For IPv4 and IPv6 packets without
extension headers this preserves the existing offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len
handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode
boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused
reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.
A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the
second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier
message, causing an uninitialized memory read.
Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching
other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that
were actually read from the wire. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance
cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the
candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension
non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without
verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length
extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it
read one octet past the end of the element.
_ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a
frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a
per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response,
or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can
trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited
Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c
Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element
carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists.
The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: handle overlapping allocated ranges in fallocate
smb3_simple_fallocate_range() can skip holes when an allocated range
returned by the server starts before the current fallocate offset. The
skipped hole is not zero-filled, but fallocate still returns success. A
later write to that hole may therefore fail with ENOSPC.
The function queries allocated ranges so that it can preserve existing
contents and write zeroes only into holes. However, the server may return
a range that starts before the current fallocate offset.
For example, assume the fallocate request is [100, 400) and the only
allocated range returned by the server is [0, 200):
Request: [100, 400)
Server range: [ 0, 200) allocated
Correct:
[100, 200) allocated data, skip
[200, 400) hole, zero-fill
Current:
[100, 300) skipped
[300, 400) zero-filled afterwards
The current code adds the full server range length, 200, to the current
offset 100 and moves to 300. As a result, the hole in [200, 300) is
skipped without being zero-filled.
Fix this by advancing only over the part of the allocated range that
overlaps the current fallocate offset. Ignore ranges that end before the
current offset and reject ranges whose end offset overflows.
This also prevents a malformed range length from causing an out-of-bounds
zero-buffer read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq()
at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare
802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body
offset:
len -= el_off;
For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is
shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to
wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a
very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb.
This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device
delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length
causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning.
Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements,
before subtracting el_off. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware IE lengths in connect event
The firmware-controlled beacon_ie_len, assoc_req_len, and assoc_resp_len
fields in ath6kl_wmi_connect_event_rx() are not validated against the
buffer length. Their sum (up to 765) can exceed the actual WMI event
data, causing out-of-bounds reads during IE parsing and state corruption
of wmi->is_wmm_enabled.
Add a check that the total IE length fits within the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: tas2781: bound firmware description string parsing
The TAS2781 firmware parser reads several variable-length description
strings with strlen() before checking that the string terminator is
present inside the firmware blob. A malformed firmware image without a
NUL terminator can therefore make the parser walk past the end of the
firmware buffer before the later size checks run.
Add a small bounded string-length helper and use it for all description
fields that are parsed from the firmware buffer. Keep the existing size
checks for the fixed bytes that follow each string. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate DFS referral PathConsumed
parse_dfs_referrals() validates that the response contains the fixed
referral entry array and, on for-next, the per-referral string offsets.
However, the response also contains a PathConsumed value that is later
used for DFS path parsing.
If a malformed response provides a PathConsumed value larger than the
search name, later DFS parsing can advance beyond the end of the path.
Validate PathConsumed against the search name length before storing it in
the parsed referral. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/vm: Fix BO prefetch with CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC
When prefetch region is DRM_XE_CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC for a BO VMA,
the code used it as an index into region_to_mem_type[], causing an
out-of-bounds access since the value is -1.
Resolve the preferred location for BO VMAs directly: local VRAM on dGFX
(using the BO's tile placement) or system memory on iGPU.
Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product
Security.
v2:
-Fix null dereference
(cherry picked from commit d9a4906ac03be9f6ed3f3b45c56c866b867fd75b) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer
virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the
device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid
array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension
count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size
together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent
kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds
read / info leak).
Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array.
Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()
ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:
snaptrace = h + 1;
snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
...
case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
if (snaptrace_len) {
...
if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
false, &realm)) { ... }
ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /
ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.
The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised
MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with
no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The
shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.
Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before
consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()
helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,
guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe
for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where
p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the
rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines
below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit
path. |
