| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject sleepable kprobe_multi programs at attach time
kprobe.multi programs run in atomic/RCU context and cannot sleep.
However, bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach() did not validate whether the
program being attached had the sleepable flag set, allowing sleepable
helpers such as bpf_copy_from_user() to be invoked from a non-sleepable
context.
This causes a "sleeping function called from invalid context" splat:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:169
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1787, name: sudo
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 0
Fix this by rejecting sleepable programs early in
bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(), before any further processing. |
| In Trail of Bits fickling through 0.1.12, the _process_import() method in fickle.py adds an imported name to the likely_safe_imports set whenever the source module is present in sys.stdlib_module_names and the name is absent from the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist, without inspecting what the name resolves to or how it behaves. The OvertlyBadEvals analysis pass in analysis.py then unconditionally skips any call whose function name appears in likely_safe_imports, including calls that would otherwise be flagged as overtly dangerous. As a result, any callable reachable through a non-blocked standard library module inherits module-level trust regardless of its own behavior, and check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE with zero findings for pickle payloads that reach code execution or file write through such callables. Demonstrated primitives: dataclasses._create_fn, which passes an attacker-controlled function body to exec() and yields arbitrary code execution on Python 3.7 through 3.12 (the internal _create_fn function was removed in Python 3.13); mailcap.findmatch, which internally calls os.system() on a test command taken from an attacker-controlled caps dictionary, yielding arbitrary code execution on Python versions through 3.12 (the mailcap module was removed in Python 3.13); and readline.add_history() followed by readline.write_history_file(), which writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path (POSIX platforms, where the readline module is available). fickling.load() chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, so a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed with the privileges of the victim process. The root cause is the inference of callable safety from module origin; it is independent of, and separately fixable from, the dotted __qualname__ resolution weakness tracked as CVE-2026-118938, which this advisory does not address. As of 2026-10-30 the three demonstrated modules were added to UNSAFE_IMPORTS on the vendor master branch (commit d011709) pending release; released versions through 0.1.12 remain affected, and the module-origin trust root cause persists, as demonstrated by the related CVE-2026-118938 remaining exploitable on that same build. |
| pgAdmin 4 did not invalidate a user's existing sessions when their password changed, either through the user's own change password dialog or through an administrator resetting it in User Management. A session established before the change, for example on another device or by someone who had obtained the old password or a session cookie, therefore stayed logged in after the change, which is the step a user or administrator takes precisely to cut such access off. It remained usable until it expired.
The fix rotates the user's session identifier (fs_uniquifier) whenever the password is changed, so every other session of that user is logged out. The session that made the change is logged in again and keeps its database connections. Saved server passwords, including those for shared servers, are re-encrypted under the new key; any that cannot be decrypted are cleared and the user is told. If re-encryption fails, the sessions are still revoked and the saved passwords are cleared rather than the change failing.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. |
| In server mode pgAdmin 4 keeps an account per authentication source, so the same username can exist as, for example, an internal account and an LDAP account. After LDAP or Kerberos authenticated a user, pgAdmin chose the account to log in by username alone, or took the account Flask-Security's login form had looked up, without checking that it came from the source that authenticated the user. The session therefore belonged to another account, with its role, its servers and its saved database passwords:
- An LDAP or Kerberos user whose username matched an internal account was logged in as that internal account, including the administrator account created when pgAdmin is first set up.
- With internal authentication listed before LDAP or Kerberos in AUTHENTICATION_SOURCES, the login form's internal validation looks up the account whose email was typed and keeps it even though its password does not match. A Kerberos user could type another Kerberos user's principal and be logged in as that user, and an LDAP user could do the same with an LDAP account whose email is their username.
Exploitation requires valid credentials for an LDAP directory or Kerberos realm that pgAdmin is configured to use.
The fix looks the account up by the authenticated username and the source that authenticated it, and no longer uses the account the login form found for any source but internal authentication. Internal authentication logs in that account only if it is an internal account. Desktop mode is not affected.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. |
| Improper isolation in the Avast sandbox on Windows allows a local, low-privileged attacker executing inside the sandbox to access COM interfaces to the Task Scheduler service, escape containment, and execute code with elevated privileges outside the sandbox.
The sandbox virtualizes file system and registry access but does not adequately restrict COM interface access to Task Scheduler. A process inside the sandbox can instantiate COM objects bound to Task Scheduler functionality and invoke methods to schedule and execute tasks on the host system. The Task Scheduler COM pathway is not blocked by the sandbox policy, allowing arbitrary code execution in the host security context.
This escape vector bypasses the sandbox's intended process and file isolation boundaries and can be chained with other host-level privilege escalation techniques. |
| Insufficient isolation in the Avast sandbox file virtualization layer on Windows allows a local, low-privileged attacker executing inside the sandbox to write arbitrary files outside sandbox containment and execute code on the host.
The sandbox virtualizes file system operations by intercepting write requests to protected system directories. However, the virtualization implementation fails to properly validate write targets in certain edge cases, allowing writes to bypass the virtualization redirection and reach the actual host file system in protected locations.
An attacker can exploit this to overwrite executable files, system libraries, or startup configurations with arbitrary content, leading to code execution with host privileges on subsequent system operations or reboot. |
| HCL AION is affected by a vulnerability where user sessions did not expire after a sufficient period of inactivity. An unattended authenticated session could be used by another person with access to the same system to view information or perform actions on behalf of the user, potentially resulting in unintended behavior or security impact under certain conditions. |
| WebDyne versions from 2.014 before 3.022 for Perl issue session cookies without the Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite attributes.
WebDyne::Session sets its session cookie with only a name, value and path.
Browsers then send the session ID over plain HTTP and with cross-site requests, and expose it to page scripts. A network attacker or an injected script can steal the session, and another site can make requests that carry it. |
| The WP Event Manager WordPress plugin before 3.4.2 does not properly validate ownership or the type of the user-supplied post identifiers processed by one of its frontend forms, allowing any user with a Subscriber account or above to reassign the authorship of arbitrary posts to themselves and to force them to be published. This results in content takeover and in the public disclosure of otherwise private or draft content, and requires the relevant frontend feature to be enabled. |
| Apache Wicket 10.10.0, 10.11.0 and 9.24.0 do not set the Content-Security-Policy headers on a page whose render request handler is wrapped in more than one IRequestHandlerDelegate. The framework unwraps only a single delegate level when deciding whether a request renders a page, so with a deeper chain, for example an application-provided delegating request mapper combined with CryptoMapper, the page is served without any CSP header even though CSP is enabled, and no error or warning is raised. The nonce-based protection Wicket applies to inline scripts and styles, together with any other CSP directives configured by the application, is thereby lost for those pages, exposing them to content injection the policy was meant to prevent. Applications on stock Wicket that do not wrap request handlers themselves are not affected. Versions before 10.10.0 and 9.24.0 handled nested delegates correctly. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.12.0 or 9.25.0, which fix the issue. |
| Incorrect order of security checks in Apache Wicket.
org.apache.wicket.protocol.http.ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener obtains the page a request targets before it consults its resource isolation policies, because those policies are passed that page. Obtaining the page instantiates it, and instantiating a page runs the configured org.apache.wicket.authorization.IAuthorizationStrategy. An application that refuses an unauthenticated visitor by throwing org.apache.wicket.RestartResponseAtInterceptPageException therefore throws it from inside the isolation listener, before any policy has run. That exception replaces the request handler, so the policies are never consulted and a request that came from another origin is not refused.
The exception's constructor stores the URL of the request it interrupted, so that Component#continueToOriginalDestination() can resume it once the visitor has signed in. The stored URL is the one the policies would have refused. On sign in Wicket redirects to it, and that redirect is same-origin, so the policies allow it and the listener runs in the newly authenticated session. The whole URL is stored, its query string included, so an ordinary org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.Form is resumed with the field values the original request carried in its query string and Form#onSubmit() runs with values another origin chose. A form POST is not needed for this; a plain top-level navigation carries them.
An application is affected where it registers ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener, which is opt-in and is not registered by default, and where it refuses unauthorized access with RestartResponseAtInterceptPageException followed by continueToOriginalDestination(). No application override is involved on that path: IAuthorizationStrategy#isInstantiationAuthorized() documents throwing that exception, org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebApplication throws it and org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.panel.UsernamePasswordPanel continues to the original destination, and org.apache.wicket.authorization.strategies.page.SimplePageAuthorizationStrategy in wicket-core installs the same pattern. A visitor who is already signed in is not affected, because no interception occurs. Request-body parameters stored alongside the intercepted URL are not applied to the resumed form: the resumption is a redirect, so the resumed request is a GET, and form components read their values from the query string on a GET.
As a workaround, refuse unauthorized access with org.apache.wicket.RestartResponseException instead, which does not store the original destination; visitors are then not returned to the page they asked for after signing in.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.1.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0.
Releases before 9.1.0, which is every 8.x release and 9.0.0, are not affected, because the resource isolation this issue concerns was introduced in 9.1.0. They are not protected either. Their only cross-origin defence is org.apache.wicket.protocol.http.CsrfPreventionRequestCycleListener, which works out where a request came from by reading its Origin header and falling back to its Referer header. Neither header need arrive: a browser does not send Origin on the plain GET a link uses, and the document on the other origin decides through its own referrer policy whether a Referer reaches the application at all. That mechanism therefore never made the guarantee the Fetch Metadata based policy makes, and on those releases a listener invocation from another origin is not reliably refused in the first place. Anyone on a release before 9.1.0 who wants this protection should upgrade to 9.x or 10.x and register ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. |
| Insufficient session expiration in Apache Wicket.
org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.WebSocketSettings#newWebSocketRequest() wraps the WebSocket upgrade request in an org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.ServletRequestCopy, which is kept for the life of the connection and used to build the request for every frame that arrives on it. Copying the request is deliberate and is documented as such, because the container recycles the upgrade request once the handshake is over. The container session is copied along with it, into an org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.HttpSessionCopy holding the session attributes as they stood when the connection was opened. That second copy is not necessary, because a session, unlike a request, is not discarded at the end of a request. Every frame afterwards resolves its Wicket session through ISessionStore#lookup(), which reads it out of the copy, so the connection is detached from the live container session for as long as it stays open.
Ending the session through the container therefore does not end the connection. After an idle timeout, an HttpSession#invalidate() call made from a filter or from a security framework, a container-managed logout, or a session replacement, the connection goes on resolving the org.apache.wicket.Session instance that existed when it was opened, together with that session's attributes and, for applications built on wicket-auth-roles, the signed-in state held on that same instance, so an authorization decision taken inside a WebSocket callback is taken against an identity that has already been revoked. The copy is also what the connection writes through: a Session#invalidateNow() issued from inside a WebSocket callback invalidates the copy and leaves the container session valid, and session attributes set over the connection are written to the copy rather than to the session.
An application is affected where it uses Wicket's native WebSocket support on pages or shared resources that require an authenticated session, and where sessions are ended by the container rather than by Wicket. Session#invalidateNow(), and AuthenticatedWebSession#invalidate() and #signOut() which call it, remain effective for a WebSocketBehavior on a page: they clear the page manager, and the connection can then no longer resolve the page it was opened for. A WebSocketResource is not limited in that way, because a frame naming a resource is served against a throwaway page and never consults the page manager, so such a connection outlives Wicket's own sign-out as well. Some containers close WebSocket connections themselves when the HTTP session they were opened under is destroyed, in which case the connection ends regardless; that is a property of the container rather than of Wicket. Applications that do not use the native WebSocket support are not affected.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Older, unsupported releases from 6.0.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. |
| The WP Event Manager WordPress plugin before 3.4.2 does not verify the ownership or the post type of a user supplied post identifier in its front-end event submission flow, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read and overwrite the content of arbitrary unpublished posts and pages, and to convert them into events. |
| The Essential Real Estate WordPress plugin before 5.3.5 does not verify ownership of an invoice before rendering it in one of its AJAX actions, allowing an authenticated low-privileged user to read other users' invoices, including the invoice owner's name, account email address and financial details. |
| A flaw was found in the training-operator. An incorrect object casting in the PyTorchJob ValidateUpdate webhook allows users to bypass an immutability check. This vulnerability could enable users to detach a queued job from its quota management system or hijack a running job's controller ownership. The primary impact is a Denial of Service (DoS) condition. |
| A type confusion issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An app may be able to cause a denial-of-service. |
| A flaw was found in QEMU. An assertion failure was present in the usb_ep_get() function in hw/net/core.c when trying to get the USB endpoint from a USB device. This flaw may allow a malicious unprivileged guest user to crash the QEMU process on the host and cause a denial of service condition. |
| ESP-Protocols is a collection of protocol components for ESP-IDF. Prior to mDNS version 1.11.2, the `mdns` component follows DNS name-compression pointers recursively when parsing fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) in inbound mDNS packets without capping pointer-follow depth in `mdns_utils_read_fqdn()`. An unauthenticated attacker on the same link-local network can send a crafted packet to UDP port 5353 on an `ESP-IDF` device using `espressif/mdns` with mDNS enabled. Deep recursion exhausts the fixed-size stack of the mDNS FreeRTOS task, causing a controlled panic and reboot; persistent malicious traffic can cause a crash loop. No confidentiality or integrity impact has been demonstrated, and remote code execution is not claimed. This issue is fixed in mDNS version 1.11.2. |
| Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.51.0, the VALID_LINK validation in src/main/java/emissary/server/mvc/NavAction.java accepts protocol-relative URLs when processing configured navigation links. Browser URL normalization can interpret these accepted strings as external origins. The authoritative advisory attributes open redirect, server-side request forgery, and cloud metadata access to this bypass, but it identifies neither the server-side dereference path nor how navigation-link processing reaches that path. This issue is fixed in version 8.51.0. |
| Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in Apache Thrift Java bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.24.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.24.0, which fixes the issue. |
