| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Pages belonging to largepage shared memory objects were not explicitly wired. When sendfile(2) transmitted such an object with the SF_NOCACHE flag, it freed the underlying pages after transmission even though existing mappings still referred to them.
An unprivileged local user can abuse the bug to access freed kernel memory. This can be exploited to escalate privileges. |
| Certain system calls, such open(2) with the O_TRUNC flag set, and fspacectl(2), could incorrectly free memory in largepage objects. These operations are not permitted on largepage objects, but the implementation did not verify this.
An unprivileged local user can abuse the bug to access freed kernel memory. This can be exploited to escalate privileges. |
| The ZFS_IOC_USERSPACE_MANY ioctl, used by zfs-userspace(8), truncated a 64-bit output buffer size to a 32-bit integer for the kernel allocation, but used the original 64-bit size as the buffer limit when writing records.
A local user with the "userused" delegated ZFS permission can trigger a kernel heap overflow via the ZFS_IOC_USERSPACE_MANY ioctl, potentially escalating privileges. |
| The ZFS_IOC_RECV_NEW ioctl, in the heal receive path, similarly truncated a 64-bit payload size to a 32-bit integer for allocation, then used the original 64-bit size as the length for a byteswap operation.
A local user with the "receive" delegated ZFS permission can trigger kernel memory corruption via ZFS_IOC_RECV_NEW by sending a crafted receive stream in heal mode. |
| The ZFS_IOC_SET_PROP ioctl, used by zfs-set(8), incorrectly validated the calling user such that an unprivileged user is able to set metadata on a dataset indicating that the dataset has received properties from a zfs-recv(8) stream.
Any local user can set the internal ZFS metadata flag "$hasrecvd" on datasets via ZFS_IOC_SET_PROP. |
| "managed-keys" is a feature which allows a BIND resolver to automatically maintain the keys used by trust anchors which operators configure for use in DNSSEC validation. Due to an error in the managed-keys feature it is possible for a BIND server which uses managed-keys to exit due to an assertion failure if, during key rollover, a trust anchor's keys are replaced with keys which use an unsupported algorithm. Versions affected: BIND 9.9.0 -> 9.10.8-P1, 9.11.0 -> 9.11.5-P1, 9.12.0 -> 9.12.3-P1, and versions 9.9.3-S1 -> 9.11.5-S3 of BIND 9 Supported Preview Edition. Versions 9.13.0 -> 9.13.6 of the 9.13 development branch are also affected. Versions prior to BIND 9.9.0 have not been evaluated for vulnerability to CVE-2018-5745. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix warning in poll cq direct mode
CQs allocated by ib_alloc_cq() always have a comp_handler. Though
in direct mode this handler is never expected to be called, it
is still called when the driver is reset, triggering the following
WARN_ONCE():
Call trace:
ib_cq_completion_direct+0x38/0x60
hns_roce_cq_completion+0x54/0x90 (hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_handle_device_err+Ox1c8/0x340 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_hw_v2_uninit_instance.constprop.0+0x34/0x70 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0xc4/0xe0 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hclge_notify_roce_client+0x60/0xbc [hclge]
hclge_reset_rebuild+0x48/0x34c [hclge]
hclge_reset_subtask+0xcc/0xec [hclge]
hclge_reset_service_task+0x80/0x160 [hclge]
hclge_service_task+0x50/0x80 (hclge]
process_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x154/0x414
kthread+0x104/0x144
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mfd: cs42l43: Sanity check firmware size
Currently the code checks if a firmware was received, however it does
not verify that the firmware size is larger than the firmware header. As
the firmware pointer is dereferenced as a pointer to the header
structure this could lead to an out of bounds memory access. Add the
missing check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/fwctl: Fix __fortify_panic
Fix a runtime assertion in cxlctl_get_supported_features(). Fortify
complains that it is potentially overflowing the entries array per
__counted_by_le(num_entries). Quiet the false positive by initializing
@num_entries earlier.
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 48 byte write of buffer size 0
WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1036 at __fortify_report+0x4d/0xa0, CPU#7: fwctl/1398
RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x50/0xa0
Call Trace:
__fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
cxlctl_get_supported_features.cold+0x23/0x35 [cxl_core] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: ims-pcu - only expose sysfs attributes on control interface
When the driver was converted to use the driver core to instantiate device
attributes (via .dev_groups in the usb_driver structure), the attributes
started appearing on all interfaces bound to the driver. Since the ims-pcu
driver manually claims the secondary data interface during probe, the
driver core automatically creates the sysfs attributes for that interface
as well.
However, the driver only supports these attributes on the primary control
interface. Data interfaces lack the necessary descriptors and internal
state to handle these requests, and accessing them can lead to unexpected
behavior or crashes.
Fix this by updating the is_visible() callbacks for both the main and OFN
attribute groups to verify that the interface being accessed is indeed the
control interface. |
| Spring Batch versions 3.0.9, 4.0.1, 4.1.0, and older unsupported versions, were susceptible to XML External Entity Injection (XXE) when receiving XML data from untrusted sources. |
| When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when enabling default typing. |
| There exists a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel through io_uring and the IORING_OP_SPLICE operation. If IORING_OP_SPLICE is missing the IO_WQ_WORK_FILES flag, which signals that the operation won't use current->nsproxy, so its reference counter is not increased. This assumption is not always true as calling io_splice on specific files will call the get_uts function which will use current->nsproxy leading to invalidly decreasing its reference counter later causing the use-after-free vulnerability. We recommend upgrading to version 5.10.160 or above
|
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wcn36xx: fix OOB read from short trigger BA firmware response
The firmware response length is only checked against sizeof(*rsp) (20
bytes), but when candidate_cnt >= 1, a 22-byte candidate struct is read
at buf + 20 without verifying the response contains it. This causes an
out-of-bounds read of stale heap data, corrupting the BA session state.
Add validation that the response includes the candidate data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent
[BUG]
Unlinking a refcounted file whose refcount tree has leaf blocks
triggers a fortify panic due to an out-of-bounds write.
[CAUSE]
When the last leaf block is removed from a refcount tree,
ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent() converts the root back to leaf mode
with a bulk memset on &rb->rf_records. rf_records sits in an anonymous
union with rf_list. rf_list.l_tree_depth aliases rf_records.rl_count,
and is 0 for a single-level tree. With rl_count equal to 0, the memset
writes past the 16-byte declared size of rf_records, which the fortify
checker catches.
[FIX]
Replace the bulk memset on &rb->rf_records with a correctly-bounded
memset on rl_recs[] alone, after setting rl_count to the correct value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wlcore: enable the right set of ciphers
The firmware version number check for IGTK introduced in
commit c34dbc5900b0 ("wifi: wlcore: Add support for IGTK key")
lets the amount of ciphers decrease on every boot of a too old firmware and
that is practically happening. It also does not take into account other
chips than the wl18xx. On some wl128x, the following can be observed
when connecting via nm to a common ap:
[ 484.113311] wlcore: WARNING could not set keys
[ 484.117828] wlcore: ERROR Could not add or replace key
[ 484.123016] wlan0: failed to set key (5, ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) to hardware (-5)
[ 484.123046] wlcore: Hardware recovery in progress. FW ver: Rev 7.3.10.0.142
[ 484.139923] wlcore: pc: 0x0, hint_sts: 0x00000048 count: 1
[ 484.145721] wlcore: down
[ 484.148986] ieee80211 phy0: Hardware restart was requested
[ 484.610473] wlcore: firmware booted (Rev 7.3.10.0.142)
[ 484.633758] wlcore: Association completed.
[ 484.690490] wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 14
[ 484.690490] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 484.700195] WARNING: drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c:872 at wl12xx_queue_recovery_work+0x64/0x74 [wlcore], CPU#0: kworker/0:0/892
This repeats endlessly.
Always disable IGTK on wl12xx and fix the decrementing mess. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
liveupdate: Reference count incoming FLB data
Increment the incoming FLB refcount in liveupdate_flb_get_incoming() so
that the FLB structure cannot be freed while the caller is actively using
it. Add an additional liveupdate_flb_put_incoming() function so the
caller can explicitly indicate when it is done using the FLB data.
During a Live Update, a subsystem might need to hold onto the incoming
File-Lifecycle-Bound (FLB) data for an extended period, such as during
device enumeration. Incrementing the reference count guarantees that the
data remains valid and accessible until the subsystem releases it,
preventing future use-after-free bugs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rapidio/tsi721: prevent a bad dereference in tsi721_db_dpc()
With a list_for_each() loop, if we don't find the item we are looking for
in the list, then the loop exits with the iterator, which is "dbell" in
this loop, pointing to invalid memory.
This code uses the "found" variable to determine if we have found the
doorbell we are looking for or not. However, the problem that the "found"
variable needs to be set to false at the start of each iteration,
otherwise after the first correct doorbell, then everything is marked as
found.
Reset the "found" to false at the start of the iteration and move the
variable inside the loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (occ) unregister sysfs devices outside occ lock
occ_active(false) and occ_shutdown() unregister sysfs-backed devices while
occ->lock is held. hwmon_device_unregister() and sysfs_remove_group() can
wait for active sysfs callbacks to drain, and those callbacks can enter the
OCC update path and try to take occ->lock again. That gives the unregister
paths the lock ordering occ->lock -> sysfs callback drain, while a callback
has the opposite edge sysfs callback -> occ->lock.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the real unregister and callback carrier:
occ_shutdown()
hwmon_device_unregister()
occ_show_temp_1()
occ_update_response()
Lockdep reported the circular dependency with occ_shutdown() already
holding the OCC mutex and hwmon_device_unregister() waiting on the sysfs
side:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
... (sysfs_lock) ... at: hwmon_device_unregister+0x12/0x30 [vuln_msv]
... (&test_occ.lock) ... at: occ_shutdown.constprop.0+0xe/0x40 [vuln_msv]
occ_update_response.isra.0+0xb/0x20 [vuln_msv]
occ_show_temp_1.constprop.0.isra.0+0x23/0x40 [vuln_msv]
*** DEADLOCK ***
Serialize hwmon registration and removal with a separate hwmon_lock.
Under that lock, detach occ->hwmon and update occ->active while occ->lock
is held so concurrent OCC state changes still see a stable state, then
drop occ->lock before calling hwmon_device_unregister(). Remove the
driver sysfs group before taking occ->lock in occ_shutdown(), so draining
the driver attributes cannot wait while the OCC mutex is held. Also make
OCC update callbacks return -ENODEV after deactivation, so callbacks that
already passed sysfs active protection do not poll the hardware after
teardown has detached the hwmon device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Inject SEA if kvm_translate_vncr() can't resolve PFN
kvm_handle_vncr_abort() assumes that s1_walk_result conveys an abort
when kvm_translate_vncr() returns -EFAULT. This is not always the case
as it's possible to encounter 'late' failures on the output of S1
translation, e.g. a GFN outside of the memslots.
Fix it by preparing an external abort before returning from
kvm_translate_vncr(). Get rid of the BUG_ON() in the fault injection
path while at it. |
