| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack_irc: fix possible out-of-bounds read
When parsing fails after we've matched the command string we
should bail out instead of trying to match a different command.
This helper should be deprecated, given prevalence of TLS I doubt it has
any relevance in 2026. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix out-of-bounds read on option matching
In nf_osf_match(), the nf_osf_hdr_ctx structure is initialized once
and passed by reference to nf_osf_match_one() for each fingerprint
checked. During TCP option parsing, nf_osf_match_one() advances the
shared ctx->optp pointer.
If a fingerprint perfectly matches, the function returns early without
restoring ctx->optp to its initial state. If the user has configured
NF_OSF_LOGLEVEL_ALL, the loop continues to the next fingerprint.
However, because ctx->optp was not restored, the next call to
nf_osf_match_one() starts parsing from the end of the options buffer.
This causes subsequent matches to read garbage data and fail
immediately, making it impossible to log more than one match or logging
incorrect matches.
Instead of using a shared ctx->optp pointer, pass the context as a
constant pointer and use a local pointer (optp) for TCP option
traversal. This makes nf_osf_match_one() strictly stateless from the
caller's perspective, ensuring every fingerprint check starts at the
correct option offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access
only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking
skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is
0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns
skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads
dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.
This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls
dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET
with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still
unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).
Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already
uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with
skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected;
valid ones are dumped as before.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
Call Trace:
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gro: don't merge zcopy skbs
skb_gro_receive() can currently copy frags between the source and GRO
skb, without checking the zerocopy status, and in particular the
SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS flag.
When SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS is set, the skb doesn't hold a reference
on the pages in shinfo->frags. Appending those frags to another skb's
frags without fixing up the page refcount can lead to UAF.
When either the last skb in the GRO chain (the one we would append
frags to) or the source skb is zerocopy, don't merge the skbs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dcache: Limit the minimal number of bucket to two
There is an OOB read problem on dentry_hashtable when user sets
'dhash_entries=1':
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888b30b774b0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x56/0x120
Call Trace:
d_lookup.cold+0x16/0x5d
lookup_dcache+0x27/0xf0
lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x2a/0x180
start_dirop+0x55/0xa0
simple_start_creating+0x8d/0xa0
debugfs_start_creating+0x8c/0x180
debugfs_create_dir+0x1d/0x1c0
pinctrl_init+0x6d/0x140
do_one_initcall+0x6d/0x3d0
kernel_init_freeable+0x39f/0x460
kernel_init+0x2a/0x260
There will be only one bucket in dentry_hashtable when dhash_entries is
set as one, and d_hash_shift is calculated as 32 by dcache_init(). Then,
following process will access more than one buckets(which memory region
is not allocated) in dentry_hashtable:
d_lookup
b = d_hash(hash)
dentry_hashtable + ((u32)hashlen >> d_hash_shift)
// The C standard defines the behavior of right shift amounts
// exceeding the bit width of the operand as undefined. The
// result of '(u32)hashlen >> d_hash_shift' becomes 'hashlen',
// so 'b' will point to an unallocated memory region.
hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu(b)
hlist_bl_first_rcu(head)
h->first // read OOB!
Fix it by limiting the minimal number of dentry_hashtable bucket to two,
so that 'd_hash_shift' won't exceeds the bit width of type u32. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: ignore explicit helper on new expectations
Use the existing master conntrack helper, anything else is not really
supported and it just makes validation more complicated, so just ignore
what helper userspace suggests for this expectation.
This was uncovered when validating CTA_EXPECT_CLASS via different helper
provided by userspace than the existing master conntrack helper:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x2479/0x27c0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880043fe408 by task poc/102
Call Trace:
nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x2479/0x27c0
ctnetlink_create_expect+0x22b/0x3b0
ctnetlink_new_expect+0x4bd/0x5c0
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x67a/0x950
netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x350
Allowing to read kernel memory bytes off the expectation boundary.
CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME is still used to offer the helper name to userspace
via netlink dump. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Port Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information with a physical attack. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Media allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Graphics Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Network File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes
ext4_ext_correct_indexes() walks up the extent tree correcting
index entries when the first extent in a leaf is modified. Before
accessing path[k].p_idx->ei_block, there is no validation that
p_idx falls within the valid range of index entries for that
level.
If the on-disk extent header contains a corrupted or crafted
eh_entries value, p_idx can point past the end of the allocated
buffer, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by validating path[k].p_idx against EXT_LAST_INDEX() at
both access sites: before the while loop and inside it. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED if the index pointer is out of range, consistent
with how other bounds violations are handled in the ext4 extent
tree code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_int() CONS case
In decode_int(), the CONS case calls get_bits(bs, 2) to read a length
value, then calls get_uint(bs, len) without checking that len bytes
remain in the buffer. The existing boundary check only validates the
2 bits for get_bits(), not the subsequent 1-4 bytes that get_uint()
reads. This allows a malformed H.323/RAS packet to cause a 1-4 byte
slab-out-of-bounds read.
Add a boundary check for len bytes after get_bits() and before
get_uint(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: check for zero length in DecodeQ931()
In DecodeQ931(), the UserUserIE code path reads a 16-bit length from
the packet, then decrements it by 1 to skip the protocol discriminator
byte before passing it to DecodeH323_UserInformation(). If the encoded
length is 0, the decrement wraps to -1, which is then passed as a
large value to the decoder, leading to an out-of-bounds read.
Add a check to ensure len is positive after the decrement. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| No cwe for this issue in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Access allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Access allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
